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I. Introduction

When a contract is breached the law typically provides some
version of the aphorism that the non-breaching party should be
made whole. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides that
“[t]he remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position
as if the other party had fully performed.”1 The English version,
going back to Robinson v Harman,2 is “that where a party sustains
a loss by reason of breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do
it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as
if the contract had been performed.”3 Similarly, under Article 74 of
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG), “damages are based on the principle that
damages should provide the injured party with the benefit of the
bargain, including expectation and reliance damages.”4
International arbitrations often cite the so-called Chorzów
Factory5 rule: “reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed.”6 However, application of the aphorism has proven
more problematic. In this paper, I propose a general principle that
should guide application—the contract is an asset and the problem
is one of valuation of that asset at the time of the breach.7 This
provides, I argue, a framework that will help clear up some
conceptual problems in damage assessment. In particular, it will
1. U.C.C. § 1-106 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
2. (1848) 1 Exch 850 (Eng.).
3. Id. at 855.
4. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods art. 74, Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CISG]; see Jeffrey S. Sutton, Measuring Damages Under the United
Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 737, 742
(1989) (“This provision seeks to give the injured party ‘the benefit of the bargain,’
as measured by expectation interests as well as reliance expenditures.”).
5. Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
17, at 47 (Sept. 13).
6. Id.
7. I am not concerned in this paper with the treatment of consequential
damages; on that subject, see Victor P. Goldberg, RETHINKING CONTRACT LAW AND
CONTRACT DESIGN 87–136 (2015) [hereinafter GOLDBERG, RETHINKING].
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integrate three concepts—cover, lost profits, and mitigation—
under the asset valuation umbrella.
Consider three patterns in which a contract might be
breached. In the first, the breach occurs at the time of performance.
That is the simplest case. The second is an anticipatory
repudiation in which the breach occurs before the time for
performance, and the litigation takes place after the date of
performance. Finally, the third involves a breach of a long-term
contract, the performance of which was to continue past the date
the litigation would be resolved. At what point should damages be
reckoned? I will argue that at the moment of breach or repudiation,
the damages would be the change in the value of the contract (the
asset). That implies that when assessing damages, to the extent
possible, post-breach facts should be ignored.
Let us begin with the simple case. Suppose that Sam Smith
agrees to sell 1,000 shares of Widgetco stock to Betsy Brown for
delivery on June 1 at $10 per share. On June 1, the market price
is $16 and Smith reneges. The case is decided on December 1
(hypothetical courts can work very fast) at which time the price
has fallen to $9. Brown sues for $6,000, the contract-market
differential at the date of breach. Smith counters, claiming that he
had done Brown a favor and that there should be no damages; the
$6,000 would be a windfall for Brown. Alternatively, suppose that
on December 1 the price had risen to $25 per share. Brown would
now claim that her damages should be measured by the price
differential on December 1, and therefore she should receive
$15,000. Smith would argue that damages should be measured by
the differential at the date of breach, June 1. At the time the claim
is being litigated, it clearly would matter whether we chose the
date of breach or the date of litigation as the appropriate date for
assessing damages. But at the time the parties entered into the
contract, would it matter?
Subject to a caveat to be developed below, the answer is “No.”
The forward price at the time of the breach (or repudiation) should
be the expected value at the time of the litigation. That is, when
entering into the contract, given the choice of remedy between the
forward price at the time of breach and the actual price at the time
of litigation, parties should be indifferent. Whether we invoke
rational expectations, efficient markets, or arbitrage, the
conclusion is robust. The caveat has to do with the time value of
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money. If legal prejudgment interest rates were to differ from the
market rate, the equality would no longer hold.8 In this Article I
am going to assume that issues concerning the time value of money
can be adequately dealt with, but this can be an especially serious
problem when dealing with cases in which the litigation goes on
for many years.9 So, conceptually, we should be indifferent
between a rule that says always use the breach date or always use
the litigation date—the measurement date should be chosen
behind a “veil of ignorance.” The existence of a firm rule is more
important than the content of the rule. Otherwise, the parties
would invoke the rule more favorable to them at the time of the
trial and the court would have little guidance in choosing between
the proffered measures.
Having said that, I will proceed by choosing the breach date
as the appropriate date. The advantage is that the party
contemplating nonperformance will find it easier to weigh the costs
and benefits of going forward. I recognize that some courts and
commentators object strongly to the notion that breach is an
option.10 I have suggested elsewhere that it is useful in this context
to think of the damage remedy as the price of the implicit
termination option.11 Using the breach date makes the price more
8. Suppose that the real price of Widgetco stock remained constant between
the breach date and the litigation date. And suppose further that there was
substantial inflation so that the nominal price went up 20%. If the prejudgment
interest rate reflected that inflation rate, awarding Brown her breach date
damages ($6,000) would be equivalent to awarding her the litigation date
damages ($7,200).
9. For example, in Kenford v. Erie County, 73 N.Y.2d 312 (1989), the
litigation lasted eighteen years in an era which included some years in which the
prime rate exceeded 20%; however, the statutory prejudgment interest rate was
only 3%. GOLDBERG, RETHINKING, supra note 7, at 96.
10. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance,
the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 975, 997–1016 (2005) (arguing that the theory of efficient breach
results in inefficiencies and cannot be sustained).
11. See Victor P. Goldberg, Protecting Reliance, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1033,
1049–54 (2014) (“[T]he contract law remedy is, in effect, the implied termination
clause, and . . . it should be viewed as just another contract term from which
parties are free to vary.”); GOLDBERG, RETHINKING, supra note 7, at 16–21 (“If the
contract were silent on the consequences of one party’s decision to terminate
(breach), then there might be circumstances in which termination would be the
appropriate (efficient) response.”); see also Robert Scott & George Triantis,
Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1456 (2004) (arguing that contract damages are embedded
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transparent, making the decision easier (determining that price
can still be very difficult, a point that will become clear in Parts IV
and V).
The first two patterns have received substantial treatment in
the literature. Surprisingly, significant scholars, notably J.J.
White and Robert Summers in their treatise, have rejected the
breach-date rule.12 With regard to the first, they argue that there
is a conflict between the UCC remedies for a buyer’s breach.13
Section 2-706 allows the seller to resell the goods (to cover)14 while
Section 2-708(1) gives the contract-market differential.15 Properly
conceived, there is no conflict, as I will show in Part II. With regard
to the second, White and Summers assert that “[m]easuring
buyer’s damages under 2-713 upon an anticipatory repudiation
presents one of the most impenetrable interpretive problems in the
entire Code.”16 The difficulties, as we shall see in Part III, arise
because of a failure to adopt the breach-date rule. Not all the
commentary has followed White and Summers’ position. Robert
Scott argued for the breach-date rule regarding the first pattern a
generation ago17 and Tom Jackson did the same for anticipatory
repudiation even earlier.18 My analysis of these two cases parallels
theirs. Parts II and III will be devoted to these two problems.
The third pattern, which has attracted much less scholarly
attention, raises a number of problems not present in the first two.
How, if at all, should the damage measurement take account of
possible losses that might occur post-decision? Should damages for
breach of an installment be determined in the same manner as an
options that serve as a risk management function).
12. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 6.7 (5th ed. 2000) [hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS, 5th ed.] (arguing against the
breach-date rule due to a possibility of a windfall). I will note my disagreements
with their analysis throughout the paper.
13. See id. at 236–38 (arguing that there is a conflict between Section 2-706
and Section 2-708(1)).
14. U.C.C. § 2-706 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
15. Id. § 2-708(1).
16. WHITE & SUMMERS, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 237.
17. Robert E. Scott, The Case for Market Damages: Revisiting the Lost Profits
Puzzle, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1160 (1990).
18. See Thomas H. Jackson, “Anticipatory Repudiation” and the Temporal
Element of Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages in Cases
of Prospective Nonperformance, 31 STAN. L. REV. 69, 83–84 (1978).

306

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 301 (2018)

anticipatory repudiation? In a take-or-pay or minimum quantity
contract, should there be different damage theories for a failure to
take as opposed to an anticipatory repudiation of the contract? The
case law, particularly regarding take-or-pay contracts, has been
extremely muddled.19 In Part IV, I will clarify the issues. Central
to the argument is that, for an anticipatory repudiation, the focus
should be on the change in the value of the contract at the time of
the breach. The analysis will also shed light on a classic casebook
case—Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co.20
To get a better handle on ascertaining damages in long-term
contracts, it is useful to unpack the Widgetco hypothetical. Where
does the June 1 share price of $16 come from? Widgetco’s value is
not a function of the past; it depends on projecting earnings into
the future. All sorts of things might happen that will affect
Widgetco’s future earnings. Recessions, inflation, war, market
shifts, currency fluctuations, pestilence, the health of key
personnel, oil embargos, and expropriations all might affect the
value of Widgetco. Its current market price reflects the collective
best guess as to the likelihood and impact of all of these and any
other contingencies. That is, all the uncertainty about the future
has been incorporated into a single number: the price. The same
methodology can be applied when estimating damages for the
anticipatory repudiation of a twenty-year take-or-pay contract or
an expropriation of an oil concession with many years yet to run.
The future path of costs, prices, demand, and the many factors
alluded to above would also make the future value of the contract
uncertain. The inquiry would concern the change in the price of a
single asset—the contract—at the time of the event (breach,
repudiation, or expropriation). I do not mean to suggest that it
would be easy. But the principle is important. The argument will
be developed in Part IV (long-term contracts) and Part V
(international investment arbitrations).

19. See generally, e.g., Manchester Pipeline Corp. v. Peoples Nat. Gas Co.,
862 F.2d 1439 (10th Cir. 1988); Prenalta Corp. v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 944
F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1991); Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 863 P.2d
1150 (Okla. 1993); Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Chemco, Inc., 854 P.2d 1232 (Colo.
1993); ANR Pipeline Co. v. Union Oil Co., No. CIV 89-833-R (W.D. Okla. Oct. 16,
1989).
20. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
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Throughout this paper, I will refer to the damage measure as
the market-contract price differential. Because, in practice, there
will often not be an actual market price, it might be better to label
this the “current-contract” price differential. The reader should
feel free to use the two interchangeably.
II. The Seller’s Remedy for Breach
In a contract for the sale of goods, when the buyer breaches,
the UCC provides two alternative remedies and that has led to
some confusion.21 Section 2-706 allows the seller to resell the goods
(to cover), and reckons the damages as the difference between the
contract price and the price at which the goods were sold.22 Section
2-708(1) provides for the market-contract differential.23 If at the
time of a buyer breach the market price had fallen, the buyer’s
liability would be the market-contract differential.24 But suppose
that the market price subsequently rose and the seller resold the
goods at a price greater than the contract price. Some
commentators perceive a conflict between 708 and 706, arguing
that allowing recovery of the contract-market differential would
give the seller a windfall.25 White and Summers, while noting that
the UCC is unclear, opt for restricting recovery:
Whether the drafters intended a seller who has resold to recover
more in damages under 2-708(1) than he could recover under
2-706 is not clear. We conclude that a seller should not be
permitted to recover more under 2-708(1) than under 2-706, but
we admit we are swimming upstream against a heavy current

21. Specific performance is typically not available in the United States for
sales contracts. Specific performance coupled with a constructive trust would be
equivalent to awarding damages determined at the time of performance. U.C.C.
§§ 2-706, 2-708(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
22. See id. § 2-706 (“[T]he seller may resell the goods concerned . . . and may
recover the difference between the resale price and the contract price . . . .”).
23. See id. § 2-708(1) (“[T]he measure of damages for non-acceptance or
repudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market price at the time
and place for tender and the unpaid contract price . . . .”).
24. Id.
25. See WHITE & SUMMERS, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 271.
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of implication which flows from the comments and the Code
history.26

Some courts and other commentators have joined White and
Summers in their concern about a possible windfall.27 Robert Scott
debunked the idea over two decades ago,28 but it still hangs on. I
will have another go at it here.
The argument is that awarding the contract-market
differential could overcompensate sellers. Consider a simple
example: Widgetco promises to sell to Buildco 1,000 tons of widgets
for delivery on January 1 for $100,000. On January 1, Buildco
breaches and the market value is $70,000. Damages? $30,000. But,
Buildco argues, Widgetco didn’t sell right away; it held the widgets
for four more years, ultimately selling them for $120,000. Citing
Section 2-706, Buildco claims that the resale should be taken into
account and that Widgetco didn’t lose $30,000 after all.
Compensating that amount would mean that Widgetco would net
$50,000, which would be a windfall. So goes the argument.
The widgets four years hence might well be physically
identical, but they are not economically identical. At the moment
of breach, Widgetco has lost an asset, the right to the net proceeds
of sale on January 1. In this case it happens to be a positive
amount, $30,000. The right to sell widgets on January 1 is not the
same as the right to sell physically identical widgets at some
subsequent date. Awarding Widgetco $30,000 puts it in as good a
26. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 362,
§ 6.7 (6th ed. 2010) [hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS, 6th ed.].
27. See, e.g., Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.2d 1074, 1083 (9th Cir.
1979) (“If this court were to allow the full Section 2-708(1) measure of
damages . . . then plaintiff would receive a . . . windfall.”); Tesoro Petroleum
Corp. v. Holborn Oil Co., 145 Misc. 2d 715, 716 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (“[G]ranting
the plaintiff the profit it seeks would result in a windfall . . . .”); Eades
Commodities, Co. v. Hoeper, 825 S.W.2d 34, 38 (Mo. App. Ct. 1992) (“[T]he seller
who resells goods has damages based upon the difference between the contract
price and the resale price. No mention of market price is found . . . .”); see also
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Conflicting Formulas for Measuring Expectation Damages,
45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 369, 398–99 (2013) (“[I]t is difficult to summon up considerations
of efficiency and fairness that would support a rule giving a promisee a windfall
by making him better off if the promisor breached than he would have been if the
promisor had performed.”); Jennifer S. Martin, Opportunistic Resales and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 487, 503 (“[B]arring a seller’s
recovery of increased damages is . . . consistent with the concept of efficiency.”).
28. Scott, supra note 17, at 1190.
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position as if the other party had fully performed. However, in
addition to the $30,000 it would still have the widgets, which would
be worth $30,000 less than they were when the contract was
formed. Had it in fact sold the widgets at the market price at the
moment of breach, Widgetco would be in exactly the same position
as if the contract had been performed (ignoring the costs of both
finding a new buyer and litigation).
After January 1, it would be free to buy, sell, or use widgets or
any other assets. The subsequent course of prices of widgets (or
any other assets) bears no relation to what it had lost at the time
of the buyer’s breach. If it held the widgets, it bore the risk of
subsequent price changes. Suppose that in the four years following
January 1 it had, at various dates, bought and sold physically
identical widgets. The prices of those transactions are as relevant
to its damage award as the prices of Widgetco stock or any other
assets it might have bought or sold in that subsequent period—
namely, no relevance at all. The simple point is this: If the market
price information is easily available, the quest for the remedy
should be over. If the seller decides to hold, use, eat, or resell the
item, that ought to be of no concern to the breaching buyer.29
For an amusing example of the correct treatment of the issue
in a non-UCC context, see Kearl v. Rausser,30 a double-barreled
battle of the experts. One group of economic experts was suing
another expert for breach of contract and the experts presented
conflicting expert opinions on the damages.31 The issue concerned
the valuation of shares of stock.32 After the breach, the stock price
had risen and the defendant (Rausser) had sold shares at various
dates at prices above the price on the date of breach.33 The
29. For a similar argument, see generally Henry Gabriel, The Seller’s
Election of Remedies Under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Expectation
Theory, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429 (1988).
30. 293 Fed. App’x 592 (10th Cir. 2008).
31. See id. at 593 (“The parties before us, four professional economists,
dispute the existence and terms of a contract for sharing proceeds associated with
the transfer of their litigation consulting practices . . . .”).
32. When Rausser moved his practice to Charles River Associates (CRA),
part of his compensation was a forgivable loan to buy shares of CRA stock. He, in
turn, promised to share some of the stock with other economists he brought to
CRA. The dispute was over how many shares of CRA stock Rausser had promised
the plaintiffs and the valuation of that stock. Id. at 594.
33. See id. at 597 (“Dr. Rausser sold 100,000 shares of stock in the fall of
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plaintiffs won a jury verdict based on the post-breach sale prices;
the Court of Appeals reversed.34
Instead of seeking to measure their losses as of the date of Dr.
Rausser’s breach, plaintiffs were free under the jury
instructions given to argue for damages months and even years
after any possible breach date. Indeed, plaintiffs’ damages
theory valued the stock as of the dates of Dr. Rausser’s sales
and, for the stock he retained, the date of trial.35

If the market price were not so easily available, then the
proceeds of resale might come into play. Rather than treat Section
2-706 as an alternative or coequal remedy, it is more useful to view
it as a possible source of evidence of the market price at the time
of the breach.36 The persuasiveness of the evidence from a
subsequent resale would depend on the temporal proximity and on
the availability of other evidence. If the seller were to resell
promptly that would be good evidence of the market price and the
burden should be on the buyer to show that the sale price was
unreasonable. If the market were thin, this would be especially
important and the buyer’s proof burden should be high. So, for
example, in a well-known casebook case, Columbia Nitrogen’s
claim that Royster resold its fertilizer at too low a price should
have been met with great skepticism.37 The four years in the
hypothetical should certainly not qualify as reasonable evidence.
2003; in February 2004 [he] surrendered 73,531 shares . . . to settle [a] loan;
between June 14 and October 27, 2004 [he] sold roughly 50,000 more shares at
various prices . . . .”).
34. See id. at 593 (“Because [the plaintiffs’ damages] theory, which yielded a
jury verdict of more than $5 million, allowed plaintiffs to recover losses up to the
time of trial—without any reference to the date of the alleged breach of contract—
we are obliged to reverse.”).
35. Id. at 605.
36. Ellen Peters suggested this many years ago: “[M]uch of 2-706 should
therefore be evidentiary rather than directory, a possible but not a necessary
reading of the section as now drafted.” Ellen A. Peters, Remedies for Breach of
Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L. J. 199, 256 (1963). However, she also noted:
“Though the Code favors substitute transactions, it does not compel them. In their
absence, the Code reconstructs, with some variations, the time-honored
market-contract differentials as bases for recovery.” Id. at 257–58 (citations
omitted).
37. See VICTOR P. GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 162–63 (2006) (critiquing Columbia Nitrogen v. Royster Co.)
[hereinafter GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT].
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How does this play out in practice? The Oregon Supreme Court
was faced with the problem in a recent case, Peace River Seed
Co-Operative, Ltd. v. Proseeds Marketing, Inc.38 The seller of grass
seed was an agricultural cooperative of grass seed producers. It
entered into a number of fixed price contracts with a single buyer
to sell fungible seeds over a two-year period. The buyer was to
provide shipping and delivery instructions. The market price fell
and the buyer refused to provide shipping instructions. After
buyer’s continued refusal, seller cancelled the contracts; the court
concluded that the buyer had breached and all that was left was
the determination of damages.39 There is no discussion in the case
as to whether the performance date for all the contracts had
passed. The court focused on a single contract and I will do
likewise.
The contract price was seventy-two cents per pound. The
market price at that time of the breach was sixty-four cents, so
under 2-708 the damages would be eight cents per pound.40
However, “[o]ver the next three years, plaintiff was able to sell at
least some of the seed that defendant had agreed to purchase to
other buyers.”41 Some of the contract seed, the buyer claimed, was
sold at seventy-five cents per pound. The decision does not make
clear when in that three-year period the seed was sold. The buyer
argued that if the seller were awarded the eight cents it would
receive a windfall, since it would also receive the extra three cents
from the subsequent sale. To further confuse the matter, the court
noted that the seller claimed that some of the seed had been sold
at sixty cents, which would have resulted in a higher measure of
damages. Thus, it appears that over the course of the three years
there were a number of sales of seed at different prices. The seller

38. Peace River Seed Co-Operative, Ltd. v. Proseeds Marketing, Inc., 355 Or.
44 (2014). Why this case? At a recent conference, a contracts professor gave this
as an example of an erroneous decision. I disagreed. Given her persistence, I
decided to dig further into the case. For her take on the case, see Jennifer Martin,
Opportunistic Resales and the Uniform Commercial Code, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV.
487.
39. Peace River, 355 Or. at 47.
40. Id. at 48
41. Id. at 47. In Peace River’s brief it referred to sales over a four-year period.
Brief on the Merits of Respondent on Review, id. at 4.
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could have sold the seeds at the market price (sixty-four cents) at
the time of the breach, but chose not to.
The question was: Should any (or all) of these different prices
be recognized when reckoning damages? The trial court chose to
recognize at least some of these prices, thereby favoring the
buyer.42 This decision was reversed by the Oregon Court of Appeals
and the Oregon Supreme Court upheld that decision.43 The Oregon
Supreme Court based part of its conclusion on a comparison of
buyer and seller remedies under the Code. For sellers the available
remedies are resale price damages and market price damages. The
court noted: “[I]t lists those remedies without any limiting
conjunction, such as ‘or,’ that might suggest that the remedies are
mutually exclusive.”44 The buyer’s remedy, however, only allows
for cover or damages for nondelivery. “Thus, although the buyer’s
index of remedies suggests that a buyer who covers may be
precluded from seeking market price damages, the seller’s index of
remedies does not contain a similar limitation if the seller chooses
to resell.”45 This emphasis on conjunctions exemplifies the
confused way the court tackles what turns out to be a simple
problem. The issue was not grammar; it was economics.
The disposition of the goods would be relevant only if the
market price information were not easily ascertainable. A
subsequent sale (or purchase) might provide reasonable evidence
of the market price at the time of the breach. The closer in time to
the breach, the more plausible the notion that the sale price would
be the market price. For complex goods that are not frequently
traded—for example, multi-year time charters—the time between
breach and ascertaining the market price might be measured in
weeks or months.46 For items sold in fairly thick markets—for
example, grass seed—the period might be measured in days or
hours. In Peace River, it appears that there were subsequent sales
at different prices spread over a three-year period.47
42. Peace River, 355 Or. at 47.
43. Id. at 46.
44. Id. at 55.
45. Id.
46. See generally Golden Strait Corp. v. Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha
(The Golden Victory) [2005] EWHC 161 (Eng.).
47. In its brief, Peace River suggested that it sold some, but not all, of the
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If the remedy were based on resale, the parties would identify
the sales most favorable to their position. As Ellen Peters noted, it
is easy to manipulate damages when the seller deals regularly with
the market:
The buyer or seller who, by the nature of his business
enterprise, constantly enters into new contracts for related
goods and services in a market where prices fluctuate broadly
and abruptly, will have a wide range of alternatives to
substitute for the contract in default. It is only realistic to expect
injured claimants to allocate as a substitute contract that which
gives rise to the largest amount by way of damages.
***
It would be a most unusual seller who could not use these
openings to create a number of alternative substitutes with
which to play.48

In its brief, Peace River recognized that at the time of the breach
it could, but need not, resell immediately and that if it failed to do
so, it would bear the risk:
Because the law treats the contract as terminated without any
transfer of ownership, the seller remains the owner of the goods.
The seller may deal with the goods as it sees fit. The seller may
sell the commodities immediately at the “market price” and
take the cash. Alternatively, the seller may keep the goods for
its own use; hold the commodities for later sale hoping that the
price will go up, but taking the risk that the price will go down;
or (as Peace River apparently did in part here) largely hold
them until they lose all their value.49

It also described one way of ascertaining the market price at the
time of the breach:
Peace River presented unopposed testimony that the custom in
the industry allowed parties to similar contracts to enter into
“wash” transactions under which the seller pretends that it
ships the seed and gets the contract price, and the breaching
buyer resells the seed to the seller at the current market price.
seeds in four years “before the seed expired and became a liability.” Brief on the
Merits of Respondent on Review at 4, Peace River Seed Co-Operative, Ltd. v.
Proseeds Marketing, Inc., 355 Or. 44 (2014) (No. S060957).
48. Id.
49. Brief on the Merits of Respondent on Review at 16, Peace River, 355 Or.
44 (No. S060957).
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In essence, they “wash” the obligation to ship both ways and the
breaching buyer pays just the difference between the contract
and market price, plus incidental damages. [UCC § 2-708(1)]
precisely matches that custom. Proseeds itself entered into a
three-way “wash” transaction that gave Peace River the
difference between its contract price and market price. Doing so
acknowledges the custom Peace River’s evidence established.50

The wash transaction simply replicated the time-of-the-breach
remedy. The only concern would have been whether the market at
the time was so thin that the seller could behave opportunistically,
claiming a wash price that was more favorable to it than a neutral
estimate of the market price.
The value of the contract at the time of the breach was
determined by the contract-market differential at that point in
time.51 If the seller did not dispose of the seeds in a timely manner,
it bore the risk of subsequent price changes. Properly conceived,
there was no conflict between Sections 2-706 and 2-708(1).
Whether a particular resale did reflect the market price at the time
of the breach would have been a fact question. And the court should
have concluded that the price of grass seed three years after the
breach was stale information.
Neither the decisions nor the Briefs in Peace River dealt with
the possibility that, when Peace River cancelled the remaining
deliveries (that is, when the buyer breached), the due dates for
performance in those contracts were subsequent to the
cancellation. That is, what if the buyer anticipatorily repudiated
the contract? That would add a new problem but the principle
would remain the same. Suppose that the breach date was January
1 and at the time of the breach, one of the contracts had a delivery
date six months later. The relevant market price would be the
forward price, the price on January 1 for the goods with a delivery
date of June 1. It might turn out that the forward price could not
be ascertained directly and the courts might have to resort to other
observable prices as evidence—perhaps the market price on either
January 1 or June 1 and resale prices at or near those dates might

50. Id.
51. See Peace River, 355 Or. at 46 (“[W]e consider the relationship . . . which
measures a seller’s damages as the difference between the unpaid contract price
and the market price at the time and place for tender.”).
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be the best evidence, but we should not lose sight of the basic
principle. I will elaborate on that in the next Part.
III. Anticipatory Repudiation
In this Part, I consider the case in which the court’s decision
would come after the final date of performance, so the court would
have access to all post-termination information. I defer to Part IV
the case in which at least some of the performance would have been
due after the decision date.52 Should damages be assessed as of the
date the repudiation was accepted, the date that performance was
due, or some other date? The law and commentary has been mixed.
I will argue that damages should be reckoned at the moment when
the repudiation has been accepted (or deemed accepted).
Pre-Code cases generally opted for the time-of-performance.
Missouri Furnace Co. v. Cochran53 is a typical pre-Code case. The
seller had promised to deliver coke at $1.20 per ton on a daily basis
for a full year. The market price rose dramatically, and the seller
rescinded the contract less than two months after performance had
begun. The buyer then immediately entered into a cover contract
for the remainder of the year at $4.00 per ton (the market rate for
a forward contract on that date).54 However, the market price soon
fell to $1.30 per ton. The buyer’s claim for damages was based on
the cover price of $4.00, but the court awarded damages on the

52. One issue that can arise in anticipatory repudiation cases is how a court
should take into account facts that are learned post-repudiation. Suppose, for
example, that the contract included a force majeure clause that allowed a party
to terminate the contract, and suppose further that some time after the
repudiation had been accepted the force majeure event occurred. Should the
damage assessment take that new information into account? This question has
received considerable attention in England in the last decade. See Golden Strait
Corp. v Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha (The Golden Victory) [2005] EWHC 161
(Eng.) (finding that damages should reflect the actual loss which would have been
suffered). Unfortunately, the court held that the post-repudiation facts should be
taken into account. I have argued elsewhere that their treatment of the question
was a mistake. See generally Victor P. Goldberg, After The Golden Victory: Still
Lost at Sea, 21 J. INT’L MAR. L. 2–111 (2016). I will not, therefore, pursue the
question further here.
53. 8 F. 463 (W.D. Pa. 1881). For a critical analysis of the decision, see
Jackson, supra note 18.
54. Missouri Furnace, 8 F. at 463.
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basis of the spot price of coke on each of the delivery dates. By
covering, held the court, the buyer took a risk:
The good faith of the plaintiff in entering into the new contract
cannot be questioned, but it proved a most unfortunate
venture. . . . As the plaintiff was not bound to enter into the new
forward contract, it seems to me it did so at its own risk, and
cannot fairly claim that the damages chargeable against the
defendant shall be assessed on the basis of that contract.55

Some post-Code cases have followed this path. I will consider
two that illustrate different ways in which the courts have done so.
In Cargill, Inc. v. Stafford,56 the seller repudiated a sale of wheat.
The buyer, Cargill, claimed damages based on the date at which
Cargill accepted the repudiation (September 6) and the trial court
accepted that.57 However, in interpreting the Section 2-713
language, “when the buyer learned of the breach,” the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that this meant “time of
performance.”58 In part it relied on pre-Code precedent—“a clear
deviation from past law would not ordinarily be accomplished by
Code ambiguities.”59 It also relied on the fact that Section 2-723,
which deals with repudiations in which some of the performance
would be due after the court’s decision, explicitly referred to the
time of repudiation, whereas Section 2-713 did not. This semantic
argument shows up in other cases and in the White and Summers
treatise as well.60
Then the argument takes a strange turn. The court asserts
that the remedy would depend on whether or not there was a valid
reason for the buyer not covering:
55. Id. at 467. To make matters worse for the buyer it “had in its hands more
coke than was required in its business, and it procured—at what precise loss does
not clearly appear—the cancellation of contracts with Hutchinson [the cover
contracts] to the extent of 20,000 tons.” Id. at 463.
56. 553 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1977).
57. Id. at 1224.
58. Id. at 1226.
59. Id.
60. See Hess Energy, Inc. v. Lightning Oil Co., 338 F.3d 357, 363 (4th Cir.
2003) (“Thus, we conclude that the better reading of § 8.2-713 is that an aggrieved
buyer’s damages against a repudiating seller are based on the market price on
the date of performance—i.e., the date of delivery.”); see also WHITE & SUMMERS,
5th ed., supra note 12, § 6-7, at 237 (examining Section 2-713 to conclude that
“[w]e favor the third interpretation—time of performance”).

RECKONING CONTRACT DAMAGES

317

We conclude that under § 4-2-713 a buyer may urge continued
performance for a reasonable time. At the end of a reasonable
period he should cover if substitute goods are readily available.
If substitution is readily available and buyer does not cover
within a reasonable time, damages should be based on the price
at the end of that reasonable time rather than on the price when
performance is due. If a valid reason exists for failure or refusal
to cover, damages may be calculated from the time when
performance is due.61

This reflects the notion that cover is a separate remedy, rather
than merely evidence of the price at the time of the breach
(accepted repudiation). The court remanded, holding that:
If Cargill did not have a valid reason, the court’s award based
on the September 6 price should be reinstated. If Cargill had a
valid reason for not covering, damages should be awarded on
the difference between the price on September 30, the last day
for performance, and the July 31 contract price.62

So, depending on what had happened to the price in the interim,
the parties could argue over whether Cargill had covered, if it had,
which transaction was the cover transaction, and if not, over the
validity of Cargill’s reason.
Did Cargill cover? The court says: “The record contains scant,
if any, evidence that Cargill covered the wheat.”63 And again: “The
record does not show that Cargill covered or attempted to cover.
Nothing in the record shows the continued availability or
nonavailability of substitute wheat.”64 And so the case was
remanded to determine whether Cargill had a valid reason for
failing to cover. Cargill, of course, was (and still is) a major player
in a thick market. It engages in numerous wheat transactions
every day. It makes no sense to identify any particular trade as the
cover contract. So, unless the wheat market somehow disappeared
on or around September 6, substitute wheat would have been
readily available. To even ask whether Cargill covered makes no
sense, and it makes even less sense to ask whether the reason for
not covering was valid or invalid. Despite the fact that the court
appeared to adopt the “time of performance” measure, given its
61.
62.
63.
64.

Cargill, 553 F.2d at 1227.
Id.
Id. at 1226.
Id. at 1227.
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garbled treatment of the cover question, on remand a court could
just as well find that (a) a substitute was readily available,
(b) Cargill didn’t have a reason for not covering, and, therefore,
(c) the appropriate date would have been the time of repudiation.
Or not. Note that the trial court and Cargill used the spot price of
wheat on September 6, not the forward price. I will return to this
point.
In Hess Energy, Inc. v. Lightning Oil Co., Ltd.,65 the seller of
natural gas, Lightning, repudiated its agreement. In its defense
Lightning made a common fallacious argument, confusing a risen
price ex post with a rising price ex ante. Hess, it claimed, “sat idly
by during a period of time when they knew the price [of natural
gas] was going up, up, up, up, up, up.”66 The court ignored this, but,
using the same semantic argument as in Cargill, concluded that
the Code required that it use the time of performance.67 The case
introduced one new complication—Hess’s use of the futures
market to avoid price risk. The court argued that this would affect
how damages should be measured.68
To understand why this would be wrong, it is useful to first
reproduce the court’s description of Hess’s use of the futures
market:
65. 338 F.3d 357 (4th Cir. 2003).
66. Id.
67. See id. at 363 (“Thus, we conclude that the better reading of § 8.2-713 is
that an aggrieved buyer’s damages against a repudiating seller are based on the
market price on the date of performance—i.e., the date of delivery.”).
The Second Circuit made a similar argument:
We would accept Southwire’s argument that the date Trans World
learned of the repudiation would be the correct date on which to
calculate the market price had this action been tried before the time for
full performance under the contract. See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-723(1) (market
price at time aggrieved party learned of repudiation used to calculate
damages in action for anticipatory repudiation that “comes to trial
before time for performance with respect to some or all of the goods”).
However, where damages are awarded after the time for full
performance, as in this case, the calculation of damages under section
2-708(1) should reflect the actual market price at each successive date
when tender was to have been made under the repudiated installment
contract.
Trans World Metals, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 769 F.2d 902, 904–06, 909 (2d Cir.
1985)
68. Hess Energy, 338 F.3d at 364–65.
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Hess’ business was to purchase natural gas from entities like
Lightning . . . and, once it did so, to locate commercial
customers to which it could sell the natural gas. Hess’ business
was not to profit on speculation that it could resell the
purchased natural gas at higher prices based on favorable
market swings, but rather to profit on mark-ups attributable to
its transportation and other services provided to the end user of
the natural gas. Because Hess entered into gas purchase
contracts often at prices fixed well in advance of the execution
date, it exposed itself to the serious risk that the market price
of natural gas on the agreed-to purchase date would have fallen,
leaving it in the position of having to pay a higher price for the
natural gas than it could sell the gas for, even after its
service-related mark-up. To hedge against this market risk, at
each time it agreed to purchase natural gas from a supplier at
a fixed price for delivery on a specific date, it also entered into
a NYMEX futures contract to sell the same quantity of natural
gas on the same date for the same fixed price. According to
ordinary commodities trading practice, on the settlement date
of the futures contract, Hess would not actually sell the natural
gas to the other party to the futures contract but rather would
simply pay any loss or receive any gain on the contract in a cash
settlement. In making this arrangement, Hess made itself
indifferent to fluctuations in the price of natural gas because
settlement of the futures contract offset any favorable or
unfavorable swings in the market price of natural gas on the
date of delivery, allowing Hess to eliminate market risk and rest
its profitability solely on its transportation and delivery
services.69

The court argued that by defaulting on the first half of the
paired transactions, Lightning exposed Hess to the price risk that
Hess had attempted to avoid.70 White and Summers
enthusiastically endorse this opinion: “In affirming Hess’ jury
verdict . . . the Fourth Circuit agrees with our interpretation and
arguments . . . for the proposition that Section 2-713 measures the
contract market difference at the time of delivery not at time of
repudiation in a repudiation case. Hurray for Judge Niemeyer.”71
The court failed to recognize, however, that if the remedy were
69. Id. at 359.
70. See id. at 364–65 (“But its repudiation of the contract cannot shift to Hess
the very market risk that Hess had sought to avoid by entering into contracts for
the future delivery of gas in the first place.”).
71. WHITE & SUMMERS, 6th ed., supra note 26, § 7-7, at 325–26.
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based on the forward price at the time of the accepted repudiation,
then Hess’s neutral hedge position would have been maintained.
Hess could have closed out its position at the then current price for
future delivery. By using that price, Hess would have received the
change in the value of the contract at the moment the repudiation
was accepted. If Hess chose not to do so, it would bear the risk of
subsequent price changes.
In other cases, courts have used the time of repudiation in
determining damages.72 In Oloffson v. Coomer,73 a farmer (Coomer)
promised in April to sell 40,000 bushels of corn to a grain dealer
for delivery in October and December. However, in June Coomer
informed Oloffson that, because the season had been too wet, he
would not be planting any corn. The contract price was about $1.12
and the price for future delivery at that time was $1.16. Oloffson
ultimately purchased corn at much higher prices after the delivery
dates had passed ($135 and $149) and argued that its damages
should be based on those prices.74 The court found that, given the
nature of the market, a commercially reasonable time to await
performance was less than a day. 75 Ultimately, the court affirmed
the trial court’s use of the forward price at the time of repudiation
($1.16) when calculating damages.76 Professor Jackson, using
Oloffson to illustrate his argument, asserted that “contract law
presumptively should adopt a general rule that an aggrieved buyer

72. See First Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Jefferson Mortg. Co., 576 F.2d 479, 492
(3d Cir. 1978) (“[T]he expression ‘at the time the buyer learned of the breach’
means ‘at the time the buyer learned of the repudiation’.”); Trinidad Bean &
Elevator Co. v. Frosh, 494 N.W.2d 347, 353 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992) (“We conclude
that best effect is given to the statutes if ‘learned of the breach,’ in § 2-713(1),
refers to the time the buyer learned of the seller’s repudiation.”).
73. 296 N.E.2d 871 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
74. Id. at 873.
75. See id. at 874
Since Coomer’s statement to Oloffson on June 3, 1970, was unequivocal
and since ‘cover’ easily and immediately was available to Oloffson in
the well-organized and easily accessible market for purchases of grain
to be delivered in the future, it would be unreasonable for Oloffson on
June 3, 1970, to have awaited Coomer’s performance . . . .
76. See id. at 873 (“The trial court . . . found that plaintiff was entitled to
recover judgement only for the sum of $1,500 plus costs . . . which is equal to the
amount of the difference between the minimum contract price and the price on
June, 3 1970, of $1.16 per bushel . . . . [J]udgment . . . affirmed.”).
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should cover at the forward price as of the date of the
repudiation.”77
While this is essentially the same position I have taken,
Oloffson does raise one problem. The court noted that Oloffson had
argued that he “adhered to a usage of trade that permitted his
customers to cancel the contract for a future delivery of grain by
making known to him a desire to cancel and paying to him the
difference between the contract and market price on the day of
cancellation.”78 Because Coomer had failed to give notice, Oloffson
argued that Coomer could not take advantage of the rule and that
damages should be measured by the price at the dates of
performance ($1.35 and $1.49). The court rejected this because, it
claimed, Coomer did not know of the alleged usage, and good faith
required that Oloffson inform him of that usage. Remarkably,
White and Summers get this completely wrong. They reluctantly
concede that “[t]he outcome of the case can be defended only on the
ground that the contract was implicitly modified by the trade
usage that prevailed in the corn market.”79 But, as noted, the court
rejected the trade usage (spot price) and chose instead the forward
price. White and Summers’ preferred date, price at the time of
performance, was not even in the running.
To call this result a trade usage is an understatement. In
Cargill, Cargill had included in its confirmation a statement that
the contract was subject to the rules of the National Grain and
Feed Dealers Association (NGFDA).80 Stafford tried to argue that
this additional term destroyed enforceability.81 The court held that
the contract was enforceable, but that the NGFDA clause was not
part of the contract.82 The court only said that the contract was not
77. Jackson, supra note 18, at 94; see also id. at 81–82 (providing Oloffson
treatment).
78. Oloffson, 296 N.E.2d at 875.
79. WHITE & SUMMERS, 6th ed., supra note 26, § 7-3, at 289.
80. See Cargill, Inc. v. Stafford, 553 F.2d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 1977) (“The
Cargill confirmation of the July 31 transaction contained a provision permitting
Cargill to cancel and a statement that the contract was subject to the Rules of
N.G.F.D.A. (National Grain and Feed Dealers Association).”).
81. See id. (“Stafford contends that these requirements were material
alterations which defeat the contract.”).
82. Using a standard 2-207 “battle of the forms” analysis, the court noted
that:
The option provisions were the addition of a material term. Under
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subject to the rules of the NGFDA, but it did not say what those
rules were. The rule today is, no doubt, the same or similar to what
it was when Cargill and Oloffson were decided: “[C]ancel the
defaulted portion of the contract at fair market value based on the
close of the market the next business day.”83 So, it appears that the
standard rule in the grain trade (when courts are willing to
recognize it) is to use the spot price, not the forward price.84 In
these instances, the difference between the spot and forward price
is unimportant. For a storable commodity (wheat, corn), the spot
price plus the expected costs of storage is a good approximation of
the forward price.
As a final example, consider Cosden Oil & Chemical Co. v.
Karl O. Helm Aktiengesellschaft.85 Cosden, a producer of
polystyrene, promised to deliver the product over a period of time
to Helm, a trader. It delivered some, but because of production
problems, it cancelled the remaining orders. Anticipating the
problem, Helm engaged in self-help, withholding payment for the
polystyrene that had been delivered.86 In response, “Cosden sued
Helm, seeking damages for Helm’s failure to pay for delivered
polystyrene. Helm counterclaimed for Cosden’s failure to deliver
polystyrene as agreed.”87 The jury found that Cosden had
anticipatorily repudiated, and awarded Helm damages based on

s 4-2-207 in transactions between merchants, the addition does not
void the contract but the other party is not bound to the new
term. . . . If the reference to [the N.G.F.D.A. rules] is a material
alteration, the principles noted in our discussion of the option provision
are applicable.
Id. at 1225.
83. NAT’L GRAIN & FEED ASS’N, NGFA GRAIN TRADE RULES 28(A)(3) (2017),
https://cb4q22fdswq370gsj3m681um-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploa
ds/2017-Grain-Trade-Rules.pdf.
84. This is not just a matter of wily grain traders attempting to take
advantage of naïve farmers. See Nat’l Farmers Org. v. Bartlett & Co., Grain, 560
F.2d 1350, 1353 (8th Cir. 1977) (showing a role reversal; the farmers’ cooperative
claimed that the buyer had repudiated and it immediately brought “all
outstanding contracts we have with your office to current market price” (all caps
omitted)).
85. Cosden Oil & Chemical Co. v. Karl O. Helm Aktiengesellschaft, 736 F.2d
1064 (5th Cir. 1984).
86. Id. at 1067–68.
87. Id. at 1068.
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“the difference between the contract price and the market price at
a commercially reasonable time after Cosden repudiated.”88
The main issue on appeal was which date should be used to
determine the market price.89 The court considered three dates:
Cosden argues that damages should be measured when Helm
learned of the repudiation. Helm contends that market price as
of the last day for delivery—or the time of performance—should
be used to compute its damages under the contract-market
differential. We reject both views, and hold that the district
court correctly measured damages at a commercially reasonable
point after Cosden informed Helm that it was cancelling the
[order].90

The learned-of-repudiation date was properly rejected since
the anticipatory repudiation doctrine gives the aggrieved party a
reasonable period of time during which it can decide whether it
should accept the repudiation. It should have enough time to weigh
alternatives. The repudiation does not become a breach until it is
accepted (or should have been accepted). For commodities traded
in thick markets (as in Cargill and Oloffson), the time period might
be measured in minutes—for others, like polystyrene, the period
would be longer. So, there were really only two choices. By rejecting
the time-of-performance, Cosden is consistent with Oloffson.
There are three things worth noting about the decision. First,
the court implies that the parties knew they were in a “rising
market,”91 not recognizing the difference between a rising market
and a risen market.92 As I have emphasized, the parties do not
know what the subsequent price path will be. Second, the court
found the relevant price to be the spot price at the time the

88. Id. at 1069.
89. See id. (“Both parties find fault with the time at which the district court
measured Helm’s damages for Cosden’s anticipatory repudiation.”).
90. Id. at 1069.
91. See id. at 1072 (“Allowing the aggrieved buyer a commercially reasonable
time, however, provides him with an opportunity to investigate his cover
possibilities in a rising market without fear that, if he is unsuccessful in obtaining
cover, he will be relegated to a market-contract damage remedy measured at the
time of repudiation.” (emphasis added)).
92. Recall Lightning’s claim that Hess “knew the price [of natural gas] was
going up, up, up, up, up, up.” Hess Energy, Inc. v. Lightning Oil Co., 338 F.3d 357,
361 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original).
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repudiation was deemed accepted, not the forward price.93 The
court did not discuss the question, nor did it indicate, that the two
prices might have been different. In this instance, it seems more
likely that it would have been more difficult to ascertain the
forward price than in the grain cases.
The third is how the parties and the court treated “cover.” Both
parties identified particular transactions in the pre-decision period
as cover transactions, Helm choosing those close to the
performance date (the higher price) and Cosden those closer to the
repudiation date:
At trial Cosden argued that Helm’s purchases of polystyrene
from other sources in early February constituted cover. Helm
argued that those purchases were not intended to substitute for
polystyrene sales cancelled by Cosden. Helm, however,
contended that it did cover by purchasing large amounts of high
impact polystyrene from other sources late in February and
around the first of March. Cosden claimed that these purchases
were not made reasonably and that they should not qualify as
cover. The jury found that none of Helm’s purchases of
polystyrene from other sources were cover purchases . . . .
We cannot isolate a reason to explain the jury’s finding: it might
have concluded that Helm would have made the purchases
regardless of Cosden’s nonperformance or that the transactions
did not qualify as cover for other reasons. Because of the jury’s
finding, we cannot use those other transactions to determine
Helm’s damages.94

It is not surprising that the parties would identify the cover
contracts that were most favorable to them. What is unfortunate
is that this would be treated as a fact question. It reflects the
notion that cover is a remedy that is alternative to the
contract/market differential, rather than possible evidence of the
price at the time of the breach. Helm, like Cargill, was a trader
engaging in numerous transactions. To ask which of them was the
cover contract presents the jury with a futile task. If the buyer did
engage in subsequent transactions, the only question the jury
should care about is whether details of those transactions would
93. See Cosden Oil & Chemical Co. v. Karl O. Helm Aktiengesellschaft, 736
F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1984) (“We . . . hold that the district court correctly measured
damages at a commercially reasonable point after Cosden informed Helm that it
was cancelling the three orders.”).
94. Id. at 1076.
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be useful in ascertaining the market price (spot or forward) at the
time of the breach.95
I do not mean to underestimate the difficulty in determining
the damages. Problems existed even in the fairly thick markets I
have discussed in this and the previous Part. And if the market
were thin there would be further difficulties. In Laredo Hides Co.,
Inc. v. H & H Meat Products Co., Inc.,96 for example, the contract
was a variable output contract for all the hides H&H produced as
a byproduct of its meatpacking business; with approximately nine
months yet to go on the contract, the seller repudiated.97 Laredo
claimed that because hides decomposed with age, it had to take the
hides on a month-to-month basis. To determine the cover price, the
court used the actual hide production of H&H in each month and
applied the then current market price. Although that required
looking at post-repudiation data, it might have been a reasonable
method for determining the change in the value of the contract.
The complexity is ratcheted up when dealing with long-term
agreements, the subject of the next two Parts.
IV. Long-Term Contracts
If a buyer were to repudiate a twenty-year contract in year
three, how should damages be reckoned? To further complicate the
picture, often neither the price nor the quantity is fixed. The price
might be indexed or subject to renegotiation; the agreement might
even include a gross inequity, or hardship, clause which would
allow a disgruntled party to appeal to an arbitrator or court to reset
the price. The contract might have a mechanism that would allow
one of the parties to terminate the agreement under certain
95. Recall Judge Peters’ argument that it would be easy to manipulate
damages by the appropriate choice of a substitute contract. See Peters, supra note
36, at 256 (“It is only realistic to expect injured claimants to allocate as a
substitute contract that which gives rise to the largest amount by way of
damages.”).
96. 513 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
97. Id. at 214–16. In Golden Strait Corp v. Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha
(The Golden Victory) [2005] EWHC (Comm) 161, [2005] 1 C.L.C. 138 [140]–[141]
(Eng.), the repudiation was of a multi-year charter with a base price that would
change over time, a profit-sharing clause, and, of course, a force majeure clause
allowing either party to terminate.
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circumstances. The buyer (in a requirements contract) or seller (in
an output contract) may determine the quantity to be supplied.
The contract might include a take-or-pay or minimum quantity
clause, and that might be modified with a makeup clause.
I think it fair to say that neither the UCC nor the courts have
been very good at dealing with these situations. “The drafters of
the 1950s probably did not contemplate 20 or 30 year contracts,”
say White and Summers:
[B]ut they clearly contemplated contracts where performance
would occur after the time for trial. Section 2-723 is designed to
deal with at least one issue in such cases. It instructs the court
to base damages on the ‘market price’ at the date that the
aggrieved party learns of the repudiation.98

White and Summers interpret this to mean that “section 2-723
must be read to measure both the contract and the market price at
the time the aggrieved party learned of the repudiation.”99 They
would then use those prices for the duration of the contract. That
is, if the contract price at the time of the repudiation was ten
dollars and the market price had fallen to six dollars, then they
would assume that for the next fifteen or so years, those prices
would remain constant.100 They recognize that “long term contracts
for the sale of commodities such as oil, gas, coal, nuclear fuel and
the like do not have fixed quantities for remote time periods.”101
What to do? “We think a court should be generous in listening to
an aggrieved party’s expert testimony about projections.”102 That
does not give us much to go on.
The decisions tend to focus on the price of the product—the
difference between the contract and market price.103 There are
98. WHITE & SUMMERS, 6th ed., supra note 26, § 7-8, at 334.
99. Id. at 335.
100. They qualify this by accepting any price information that would become
available in the period between repudiation and trial. See id. § 7-8, at 335 (“We
would twist the language of 2-723 slightly to allow parties to use the actual
market and the actual contract prices to measure damages in the gap between
repudiation and trial.”).
101. Id. § 7-8, at 337.
102. Id.
103. See Manchester Pipeline Corp. v. Peoples Nat. Gas Co., 862 F.2d 1439,
1447–48 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding that the proper measure of damages for a
long-term contract should be based upon market price).
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obvious complications for determining each since both the price
and quantity will typically not be fixed for the life of the
contract.104 Even if that problem could somehow be resolved, it still
puts the focus on the wrong question. The relevant concern should
be the change in the value of the contract at the time of the
repudiation.
Ironically, there is a class of cases in which the courts have
adopted the contract valuation approach without any fuss. When a
contract is repudiated the seller can mitigate damages in one of
two ways. The seller could continue to produce with damages being
the expected difference in revenues in the pre- and
post-repudiation worlds. But what if the expected future unit costs
of production exceeded the expected prices? Then mitigation would
entail shutting the project down. The seller’s loss would be the
expected future revenues less the expected cost of producing that
revenue—lost profit. Courts have recognized this measure,
treating it as obvious, without any reference to Section 2-723. For
example, in a casebook favorite, Northern Indiana Public Service
Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co.105 (NIPSCO), the seller closed the
coal mine and Judge Posner concluded:
The loss to Carbon County from the breach of contract is simply
the difference between (1) the contract price (as escalated over
the life of the contract in accordance with the contract’s
escalator provisions) times quantity, and (2) the cost of mining
the coal over the life of the contract. Carbon County does not
even argue that $181 million is not a reasonable estimate of the
present value of the difference.106

Courts have struggled with variable quantity contracts—
take-or-pay and minimum quantity obligations. One issue, not of
concern here, is whether these should be viewed as liquidated
damages or penalties or something else. For assessing damages,
the decisions do not always distinguish between two different
problems—the anticipatory repudiation of the contract and a
failure to perform a past obligation. After discussing the courts’
104. See id. at 1447 (“[W]e are aware of the peculiar difficulties presented by
attempting, at the end of the first year of a ten year contract, to calculate damages
for the entire contract period.”).
105. 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986).
106. Id. at 279.
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muddled treatment of take-or-pay contracts, I will consider a
Second Circuit decision in which the court was confronted with
determining damages for the early repudiation of a twenty-year
contract. Next I will consider issues raised in another of Judge
Posner’s opinions—Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co.107 I will
conclude this Part with a discussion of an English case involving
the repudiation of a take-or-pay contract.
A. Take-or-Pay
For many years, natural gas prices were regulated at below
market-clearing prices.108 One of the devices sellers used to charge
a higher effective price was to include take-or-pay clauses with a
high required “take.” That is, a buyer might have to promise to pay
for ninety percent of the contract quantity in any given year, even
if it didn’t take that much. After the industry was deregulated
there was a substantial increase in production.109 When all energy
prices fell in the 1980s gas prices plummeted too, and buyers
wanted out.110 Many deals were renegotiated; in others buyers
repudiated.111 Since natural gas is a “good,” the UCC applied and
the courts attempted to apply the Code remedies, notably Section
107. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
108. See Stephen Breyer & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and
the Regulation of Natural Gas Producers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 941, 941 (1973) (“In
the past decade, the [Federal Power Commission] has devoted much of its energy
and about 30 percent of its budget to [regulating the price of gas sold to interstate
pipeline companies] and has been remarkably effective in holding down
producers’ selling prices.”).
109. See Prenalta Corp. v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677, 680 (10th
Cir. 1991) (“The enactment of the [Natural Gas Policy Act] in 1978 permitted the
gradual deregulation of natural gas which resulted in a dramatic rise in natural
gas prices. The rise . . . provided incentive . . . for new gas exploration and, by the
1980s, natural gas supplies were abundant.”).
110. See id. (“The supply of gas for which the pipelines initially contracted
assumed a demand that no longer existed. Pipelines generally responded to these
market conditions by renegotiating existing . . . contracts with producers, and,
failing that, reducing gas ‘takes’ by making payment only on gas that could be
marketed . . . .”).
111. Over 100 cases were filed. See J. Michael Medina et al., Take or Litigate:
Enforcing the Plain Meaning of the Take-Or-Pay Clause in Natural Gas Contracts,
40 ARK. L. REV. 185, 187 n.6 (1986) (noting more than “one hundred actions
concerning enforcement of take-or-pay clauses”).
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2-723, to the problem.112 A key question for the courts was whether
the buyer would be liable after repudiating the contract for the full
price of the gas it had promised to take or a remedy based on the
price differential. The decisions reflect how the courts have
struggled to shoehorn the problem into the UCC boxes. In addition,
the courts sometimes appear to conflate two separate issues: what
would be the remedy if there were a shortfall in a single
installment, and what would be the remedy if the buyer repudiated
the entire contract?113
1. Manchester Pipeline Corp. v. Peoples Natural Gas Co.
The Manchester Pipeline Company, a seller of natural gas,
entered into a contract with Peoples Natural Gas Company (PNG),
a natural gas distribution company. “The Document provided for a
term of ten years and contained detailed provisions concerning
price, minimum ‘take’ obligations, determination of reserves, and
the right of PNG to reduce the price paid for gas taken in order to
remain competitive in the gas market.”114 PNG repudiated in the
first year. It lost its argument that there was not an enforceable
contract and the court turned its attention to damages. The Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court.115 It is instructive to see how
the trial court framed the damage question in its jury instruction:
In order to determine the amount of damages: (1) for the
first year, you may consider the evidence presented with
regard to the difference between the agreed to price, if
any, for the gas and the price obtained at resale of the gas
to Scissortail Natural Gas Company, but that price is not
conclusive, except to the extent that it reflects a
112. See Manchester Pipeline Corp. v. Peoples Nat. Gas Co., 862 F.2d 1439,
1447–48 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying 2-723).
113. UCC Section 2-612 distinguishes between non-conforming installments
which substantially impair the contract as a whole and those that do not. See
U.C.C. § 2-612 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2016) (providing different
treatment for substantial impairment). A shortfall in a single installment in a
take-or-pay contract is not an impairment; it is the exercise by the buyer of a
contractually defined option. See U.C.C. § 2-612 cmt. 4–7 (reviewing
impairments).
114. Manchester Pipeline Corp., 862 F.2d at 1441.
115. Id. at 1442–43, 1445–46.
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standardized market price at the time and place
defendant [PNG] would have had to take the amount of
gas agreed, if there was an agreement, to be taken for the
first year; plus (2) for the years two through ten, you may
consider the evidence presented with regard to the
difference, if any, between the market price for the gas at
the time and place in the future when defendant [PNG]
would have had to take that portion of plaintiff’s
[Manchester’s] reserves as agreed, if agreed, and the
agreed price, if any.116

Repudiation of the take-or-pay clause would not entitle the
seller to the stream of future payments (the “pay” component of the
take-or-pay). The post-repudiation damages would be based not on
the price, but only on the price differential. The court of appeals
agreed on that principle. The issue on which the trial judge was
reversed was how those future prices should be determined. In his
denial of PNG’s motion for a new trial, the trial judge had said:
The Court acknowledges that in most circumstances the
measure of damages for repudiation is determined according to
the price of the goods prevailing at the time when the aggrieved
party learned of the repudiation. Okla.Stat. tit. 12A. § 2–723(a)
(1981). Nevertheless, the unique circumstances of a gas
purchase agreement with a take or pay obligation requires that
the jury consider the extreme unpredictability of the future
market. Giving the jury such discretion, provides the
opportunity to find plaintiff is or is not entitled to recover
damages for any alleged loss in the future. Because the nature
of the gas market is uniquely nonstandard and the terms of gas
purchase agreements are not easily analogized to commercial
contracts in general, this Court finds the circumstances of this
case, as presented at trial, fell within the scope of the
commentary to Section 2-723, that states other reasonable
methods of determining market price or measuring damages
are not excluded from use where necessary.117
PNG objected and the Court of Appeals agreed.118 This was
not consistent with its understanding of Section 2-723. The court
116. Id. at 1446. The Scissortail contract was a spot contract Manchester
entered into when PNG repudiated.
117. Id. at 1447.
118. See id. at 1446 (“PNG argues that [the district court’s] instruction
conflicts with Oklahoma’s statutory provisions for calculating damages for
non-acceptance or repudiation of a contract. We agree.”).
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cited the Code comment:
There are no previous Oklahoma decisions. This changes the
rule as previously stated in Williston on Sales, Section 587,
which says that when an action for anticipatory breach comes
to trial before performance date the measure of damages is the
difference between the contract price and the market value at
the date fixed in the contract for performance. Thus, the jury
must speculate by attempting to predict what the future market
value will be. The Commercial Code rule is more certain and far
easier to apply.119

Like White and Summers, the court interpreted Section
2-723(1) as requiring the use of the price at the time of repudiation
for all future periods. This interpretation could lead to quite
bizarre results in a period of high inflation.120 An alternative
interpretation would be to use the expected future price structure
(the projected price on various future dates). In effect, the buyer’s
obligation was to take a number of different commodities: gas in
1985, gas in 1986, gas in 1987, and so forth. Each of those
commodities had an expected price at the moment of repudiation.
Section 2-723 need not require that we lump them all together and
apply a single price. Even if the court had resolved the price
question correctly, it remained unclear how damages should have
been assessed since other features of the contract were not taken
into account. Thus, there was no discussion of the future
quantities. Nor was there any discussion of how the competitive
pricing (or “market-out”) clause should impact the results.121 Had
the court focused on the change in the value of the contract, rather
than just the price of gas, it would have at least posed the relevant
question.

119. Id. at 1446.
120. If the inflation rate were high, say 70%, and if the nominal price of gas
was treated as unchanged for the ten years, the court would implicitly assume
that the real price of gas had fallen by half over the ten years.
121. A market-out clause allows the buyer to unilaterally modify the contract
price. In 1982, one buyer in take-or-pay gas contracts, Tenneco, unilaterally
modified 1400 contracts which had immediately exercisable market-out clauses;
it had 20 contracts without such clauses. Forest Oil Corp. v. Tenneco, Inc.,
622 F. Supp. 152, 153 n.3 (S.D. Miss. 1985).
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2. Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co.

Prenalta sold natural gas to Colorado Interstate Gas (CIG), an
interstate pipeline under take-or-pay contracts for a “term of 20
years and so long thereafter as gas is capable of being produced in
commercial quantities from the gas leases and gas rights
committed to the performance of this Agreement.”122 The contracts
included a repricing arrangement anticipating deregulation:
Section 5.1(d) provides that in the event of deregulation of the
price of gas sold under the contract, Prenalta would have the
right to request a redetermination of the price during the first
six months after the date of deregulation and during the
six-month period preceding each five-year anniversary of the
date of deregulation. Upon such request, the parties agreed to
meet and determine a fair value of the gas.123

The repricing option was the seller’s, but the problem arose when
prices collapsed and the buyer wanted out.124
CIG continued to purchase gas under the contracts so there
was no claim for repudiation. Prenalta’s claim was for the years in
which CIG had failed to take gas. It claimed that the contract was
an installment contract with failures to pay for each installment,
and that is how the court treated it. The court posed the issue as
whether this was an “alternative contract” or a liquidated damages
penalty provision.125 The court relied on Corbin in two respects.
First:
If, upon a proper interpretation of the contract, it is found that
the parties have agreed that either one of the two alternative
performances is to be given by the promisor and received by the
promisee as the agreed exchange and equivalent for the return
122. Prenalta Corp. v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677, 680 (10th Cir.
1991).
123. Id. at 681.
124. See id. (“CIG circulated an interoffice memo stating that a
‘[m]anagement decision has been issued not to make any further payments for
take-or-pay claims.’ As a result . . . CIG sent a negotiation team . . . to discuss
with Prenalta possible modifications of existing contracts.”).
125. See id. at 688 (“CIG argues that § 4.2 of the contracts provides for
alternative performance under the contracts and as such cannot be a remedy for
breach of performance. CIG further contends that if § 4.2 is interpreted as a
remedy, it is necessarily an unenforceable liquidated damages or penalty
provision.”).
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performance rendered by the promisee, the contract is a true
alternative contract. This is true even though one of the
alternative performances is the payment of a liquidated sum of
money; that fact does not make the contract one for the
rendering of a single performance with a provision for
liquidated damages in case of breach.126

Second:
An alternative contract may be so drawn as to limit the power
of the promisor to discharge his contractual duty by performing
one of the alternatives to a definite period of time, after the
expiration of which only the other alternative is available to
him. After the expiration of the specified period, the obligation
of the promisor becomes single and the contract is no longer
alternative. In cases like this, the promisee must always
estimate his damages on the basis of the second
alternative . . . . Usually the alternative that is eliminated by
the expiration of the period of time is the performance of service
or the transfer of property, while the second alternative is the
payment of a named sum of money.127

Prenalta argued that the contract “clearly provides the
contract remedy for breach, and that the measure of damages
under the provision is the value of the ‘quantity of gas which is
equal to the difference between the Contract Quantity and Buyer’s
actual takes’ for each year CIG has been in breach of the
contracts.”128 The court agreed.
We find that the language of § 4.2 . . . unambiguously expresses
the intent of Prenalta and CIG to fashion a specific remedy for
breach by requiring CIG to pay the value of the shortfall—the
contract price multiplied by the difference between the contract
quantity and the amount of gas actually taken during each one
year period.129

Characterizing CIG’s decision not to take gas as a “breach” is
misguided. The failure to take was not a breach of the contract; it
was simply CIG’s exercise of its discretion under the contract. The
only breach was CIG’s subsequent failure to pay for the flexibility.
126. Id. at 689 (citing 5 A. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1082,
at 463–64 (1964)).
127. Id. at 690 (citing 5 A. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1085,
at 469–71 (1964)).
128. Id. at 687.
129. Id. at 688.
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For each period in which CIG chose to take less than the “take,” it
would be liable for the shortfall times the current price.130
Corbin’s characterization of the alternative performance
works fine when it is applied to specific shortfalls. But what
happens when a court tries to apply it to the future years of a
repudiated contract? That question was the issue posed in Roye
Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Arkla Inc.131 and Colorado Interstate
Gas Co. v. Chemco, Inc.132 which came to opposite conclusions.
3. Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Arkla, Inc.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court purported to answer a certified
question: “What is the measure of damages under a take-or-pay
gas purchase contract where the seller alleges an anticipatory
repudiation by the buyer and buyer alleges that had it elected to
‘take’ gas, seller could not have physically delivered gas over the
entire term of the contract?”133
Roye Realty argued that “the damages for such repudiation
should be based upon the ‘pay’ alternative under the contract and
be calculated according to Arkla’s minimum obligation from the
date of the alleged repudiation through the end of the contract
term.”134 The argument took the Prenalta result and projected it
forward—the deficiency payment obligation would provide the
measure of damages for all the future years. The court disagreed—
it invoked Section 2-708 and Section 2-723, claiming that the
damages should be measured by the market/contract price
differential at the time of repudiation.
Because the provisions of the UCC apply to gas purchase
contracts, we hold that the measure of damages for anticipatory
repudiation of both the take and the pay obligations in a
130. See id. at 690 (finding that “Prenalta’s damages are therefore measured
by CIG’s obligation to pay-the value of which is the contract price in effect at the
time such deficiency occurred multiplied by the difference between the contract
quantity and the actual quantity of gas purchased”).
131. 863 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1993).
132. 854 P.2d 1232 (Colo. 1993).
133. Roye Realty & Developing Inc., 863 P.2d at 1152. Regarding the second
part of the question the court noted: “If the seller is capable of performance on the
date of the breach, the damages recoverable will not be diminished.” Id. at 1160.
134. Id. at 1152.
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take-or-pay gas purchase contract is the difference between the
market price at the time when the aggrieved party learned of the
repudiation and the unpaid contract price.135
After the repudiation, the seller would be freed of its obligation to
deliver gas and could sell to others, in effect, mitigating the loss.
“[B]y selling the gas on the open market and utilizing the
§ 2-708(1) measure of damages to get the difference between the
market price and the contract price, Roye Realty will obtain the
same price for its gas as if Arkla would have fully performed.”136
The court, as noted, used the contract/market price differential in
the first period (Section 2-723) to determine the future price. What
would it use for the future contract price and future contract
quantity? Neither of these metrics would be known on the date of
repudiation in a typical take-or-pay contract. The court was silent
on both, although I suspect that if pushed it would have assumed
that these would have remained the same over the remaining life
of the contract. Nor did the court take into account any other
features of the contract—for example, whether either party had an
early termination option or whether there was a makeup clause.
Nonetheless, the court was satisfied that it had answered the first
part of the certified question: “that the measure of damages for
repudiation is provided in the UCC.”137
As it turned out, it was not necessary to answer the first
question because the trial court eventually held that the failure to
pay was not a repudiation of the entire agreement after all; it was
only a failure to pay for an installment.138 The Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit concurred in an unpublished opinion.139

135. Id. at 1154.
136. Id. at 1157.
137. Id. at 1159.
138. See Roye Realty & Developing, Inc., v. Arkla, Inc., No. CIV-89-993-R,
1996 WL 87055, at *4 (10th Cir. Feb. 28, 1996) (“[W]e disagree and affirm the
district court’s ruling that any breach that Arkla committed did not impair the
value of the entire contract.”).
139. See id. at *4–6 (reviewing the case and case law to arrive at the district
court’s result).
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4. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Chemco, Inc.

Unlike Arkla, the court in Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v.
Chemco, Inc. appeared to find that damages for the future take
obligation would be measured by the price, not the price
differential.140 I say “appeared to” because some ambiguity exists
regarding the post-trial damage measurement. In 1985, after the
market price of gas had collapsed, the buyer in a take-or-pay
contract, Colorado Interstate Gas Company (CIG), claimed that
the contract allowed it to terminate.141 In a bifurcated trial, CIG
lost its claim on liability. In the second phase, there were three
questions. First, how much should CIG have to pay for shortfalls
in the period prior to the repudiation? Second, how much should
CIG have to pay for the post-repudiation years?
A third issue might have rendered the second question moot.
“CIG requested full production from all wells committed to the
contract effective May 2, 1988. Chemco responded with a request
for ‘reasonable written assurances’ that CIG would ‘consider the
contract in force and effect’ and intended to ‘perform [CIG’s]
obligations under it for the remainder of its term.’”142 The jury
found that the demand for assurance was justified and that CIG’s
response did not provide adequate assurance.
The jury found damages of about $3 million, about 10% of
which were for the post-1988 (trial) period. The court does not say
how the post-1988 damages were measured. In the court’s only
discussion of damages it favored the price remedy: “The trial court
further instructed the jury that, if they found actual damages, they
should award ‘as such actual damages all take-or-pay payments
due Chemco under the terms of the contract.’”143 Citing Corbin, the
court
stated:
“Once
the
‘take-and-pay’
alternative
expired . . . performance becomes the monetary payment of a sum
140. See Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Chemco, Inc., 854 P.2d 1232, 1236 (Colo.
1993) (“Accordingly, we hold that under the facts of this case the remedy for
breach of the alternative performance obligation is the payment of damages
equivalent to the value of the remaining performance obligation.”).
141. See id. at 1233–34 (recounting market decline and Chemco’s actions).
142. Id. at 1239. Chemco was asking for assurance three years after the
repudiation because, “[a]fter the phase I finding of liability, CIG requested the
resumption of full performance from all committed wells effective May 2, 1988.”
Id. at 1238.
143. Id. at 1234.
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unambiguously defined by the contract ‘the difference between the
[contract quantity] and the Buyer’s actual takes.’”144 That is clearly
correct for the pre-repudiation period. “Accordingly, we hold that
under the facts of this case the remedy for breach of the alternative
performance obligation is the payment of damages equivalent to
the value of the remaining performance obligation.”145 So, it would
seem that CIG would be liable for the pay alternative for the
duration of the contract.
But it is not clear that the court viewed CIG as having
repudiated the contract. Did CIG’s wrongful claim of a right to
terminate entail the total breach of the contract, and did its
subsequent request for the resumption of full performance after its
loss of the liability phase in 1988 mean that the original contract
was still in force? Had CIG only failed to make installment
payments, the entire contract would have remained in force, and
there would have been no post-trial damages. In a subsequent case
based on the same contract,146 the court held that “the parties
again had performance obligations under the contract, which both
had recognized as valid after the April 1988 trial court ruling.”147
So, perhaps Chemco does not deal with an anticipatory repudiation
at all and it is not, therefore, contrary to Arkla. I think it fair to
say that the opinion reflects the difficulties courts have had fitting
a take-or-pay contract into the UCC boxes, although it is probably
more muddled than most.
5. Lost Volume
A few courts have invoked Section 2-708(2)148 (the lost volume
seller) to justify using the price rather than the price differential
144. Id. at 1237. The court appears to have treated “take-and-pay” as
synonymous with “take-or-pay;” as noted below, a take-and-pay contract is
different, although the remedy for a repudiation would be the same.
145. Id. at 1236.
146. See Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Chemco, Inc., 987 P.2d 829 (Colo. App.
1998) [hereinafter Chemco II] (reviewing CIG’s assertion “that it was entitled to
recoupment and refund after it paid the Chemco I judgement”).
147. Id. at 834.
148. See U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2016)
(2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate
to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done
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to measure damages: “[T]hat gas which Plaintiff was required to
pay for if not taken would be unavailable to Defendants to sell upon
the expiration of their contract with Plaintiff. . . . Defendants
cannot be required to relinquish this substantial benefit under the
contract as part of its duty to mitigate damages.”149
The “benefit,” according to one commentator, A. F. Brooke,
was the right to sell the same gas twice:
This possibility of selling the gas twice was seen as a valuable
right. The court concluded that it would be inappropriate to
require the producer to have mitigated its damages by
resale. . . . The take-or-pay producer should not be required to
mitigate its damages by reselling since that would entail the
sacrifice of the substantial right to “sell” the same gas twice.150

Brooke concluded that the argument only applied to the past
shortfalls: “[T]he producer is entitled to contract-market damages
only when the pipeline has made an anticipatory repudiation of the
contract before failing to take. . . . [W]hen the contract still admits
of alternative performance, the correct measure of damages is the
one least costly to the breacher.”151 It is not clear whether a court
would have also concluded that its remedy applied only to past
shortfalls, or if it meant to apply it to future take obligations as
well.
The Prenalta-CIG dispute152 also involved a group of
“take-and-pay” contracts under which the pipeline would be
required to take and pay for a minimum contract quantity of gas

then the measure of damages is the profit (including reasonable
overhead) which the seller would have made from full performance by
the buyer, together with any incidental damages provided in this
Article (Section 2-710), due allowance for costs reasonably incurred
and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale.
149. See A. F. Brooke II, Note, Great Expectations: Assessing the Contract
Damages of the Take-Or-Pay Producer, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1469, 1484–85 (1992).
150. Id. at 1485. The double-payment argument also was raised in the
Chemco II dispute: “CIG argues that this puts Chemco in a better position than if
the contract had been performed because it results in Chemco’s receiving the full
contract price and also retaining the gas for resale.” Chemco II, 987 P.2d at 833
(parentheses and internal quotation marks omitted).
151. Brooke, supra note 149, at 1486–87.
152. See Part IV.A.2 (discussing the Prenalta dispute).
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annually.153 The court determined that for this type of contract the
appropriate remedy was to treat Prenalta as a lost volume seller:
The parties agree that [Wyoming’s version of U.C.C.
§ 2-708(1)] . . . would not put Prenalta in as good a position as if
CIG had performed because the price under the contracts is less
than the market price at the time and place of tender. Prenalta’s
remedy, therefore, is provided by [Wyoming’s version of U.C.C.
§ 2-708(2)].154

Therefore, it held, Prenalta should have the opportunity to offer
evidence of lost profits.155 The court failed to appreciate the
difference between take-or pay and take-and-pay contracts. In a
take-or-pay contract, if there were a shortfall in one time period,
the buyer would owe the price times the quantity; the seller would
be free to sell to other customers without offsetting any of the sales.
The contract would remain alive, unless the buyer chose to
repudiate. In contrast, in a take-and-pay contract, the failure to
take the contract amount in a given year would be a breach of an
installment of the contract; damages would be the contract/market
differential. If the shortfall “substantially impaired” the value of
the contract as a whole, the seller would have the option of
declaring a breach of the whole.
6. Summing Up
In long-term take-or-pay contracts, the UCC works fine for
dealing with a shortfall in an ongoing contract. The buyer would
simply pay the contract price multiplied by the shortfall and both
parties would continue to be bound by the contract.156 Courts get
there in various ways, and the reasoning is not always
transparent, but they do seem to figure it out. However, the UCC
is, as White and Summers asserted, inadequate for dealing with
153. See Prenalta Corp. v. Colo. Interstate Gas. Co., 944 F.2d 677, 680 (10th
Cir. 1991) (describing the contracts as standard take-and-pay contracts).
154. Id. at 691.
155. See id. (“We agree with Prenalta that it should be allowed an opportunity
to offer evidence of any lost profits which resulted from CIG’s breach . . . .”).
156. See U.C.C. § 2-612(3) (providing for continuance of contract). There
might be some nuances like make-up clauses, but that does not alter the basic
point.
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repudiation of long-term contracts.157 It provides an answer—not
necessarily a good answer—to the question of what price of the
goods should be used (mainly Section 2-723). It provides no
coherent answer to the question of how (or even if) future
quantities should be determined. It ignores significant features of
the contracts such as early termination rights and price
redetermination rights. Most decisions seem to conclude that for
the post-decision period damages should be based on the difference
between some measure of future contract and market prices. But
the case law seems a bit hazy on the treatment of a repudiation
and whether it should be treated differently from a shortfall in a
particular installment.
The Section 2-723 inquiry focuses on the wrong price. We could
adapt Section 2-723, recognizing that what we are looking for is
not a single price, but the set of forward prices—that is, today’s
price for delivery on each of the future dates. That set of prices
would be implicit in the valuation of the contract at the repudiation
date. And that highlights the key point. The concern should not be
with the change in the price of the gas, but with the change in the
value of the asset—the contract—at the time of the repudiation.
The contract’s value encompasses all the nuances that the Section
2-723 inquiry fails to reach. Medina et al. make this point as well:
“The payment made is for the market value of the gas contract, not
for the purchase of reserves. Therefore, after payment of the
damages, the producer will still own the gas although the reserves
will no longer be contracted.”158 The value depends on, among other
things, the nature of the take-or-pay obligation, the price
adjustment mechanism (including a possible market-out), and the
termination options.159 Because termination of the seller’s
obligation frees it to sell the gas to others, the remedy would be
based on the expected market/contract price differential;160 it
157. See WHITE & SUMMERS, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 246 (“Drafters of the
UCC anticipated these issues only dimly; the more remote in time are the events
to be measured, the more inherently uncertain is the calculation of damages.”);
see also WHITE & SUMMERS, 6th ed., supra note 26, at 334 (same).
158. Medina et al., supra note 111, at 201.
159. See id. at 188–89 (discussing deficiency payments and the relationship
between recoupment and termination).
160. This assumes that continued production would take place. If, as noted
above, the seller is better off by not producing, the damages would be the
difference between the future revenue stream and the costs avoided by not having
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incorporates mitigation by resale. In effect, we ask: how much
would the buyer be willing to pay to walk away?161
I do not mean to suggest that this would be an easy task; it
would almost certainly require some sophisticated work by
economic experts. But, I should note, this is an exercise parties
routinely engage in when negotiating a settlement. In the period
in which these cases were litigated, the overwhelming majority of
the natural gas take-or-pay contracts were renegotiated, with
many (probably most) including a lump sum payment to extricate
the buyer from the deal.162 And, as the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals said in the next case, this is the sort of exercise the parties
engaged in when entering into the deal in the first place.
B. Tractebel
In November 2000, American Electric Power Company (AEP)
entered into a Power Purchase and Sale Agreement (PPSA) with
Tractebel Energy Marketing, Inc. (TEMI). AEP would build a
cogeneration plant in Plaquemine, Louisiana that would supply
steam to Dow Chemical and electric power to TEMI. The PPSA
term was for 20 years. Because Dow needed large quantities of
steam,163 and because the steam and electricity were jointly
produced, the contract required that TEMI take a substantial
amount of electricity. The contract included a “must-take”
provision.164 It also included a minimum guarantee of $50 million
and a mechanism by which either party could request that the
guarantee be increased if it believed the guarantee had become
to produce.
161. Or we could ask: for how much could the seller sell the contract?
162. See GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT, supra note 37, at 135 (noting the
industry wide shift away from take-or-pay contracts).
163. See id. at 104
Because Dow needs large quantities of steam in its operations, the
units need to run, and therefore generate power, almost constantly.
This is not to say that all the units must run at maximum capacity at
all times. All four units can be turned down to produce less energy. In
addition, any one of the units can be turned off entirely. The remaining
three units, however, have to be on line in order to provide enough
steam for Dow to operate its plant.
164. Id. at 105.
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inadequate.165 AEP spent about $500 million building the facility;
before the facility was on line, the market for electricity collapsed
and TEMI wanted out.166 AEP requested that the guarantee be
increased to reflect the new conditions and TEMI refused.167
To show that AEP had reasonable grounds for believing that
the guarantee was inadequate it had to show that the present
value of gains and losses exceeded $50 million.168 This was not too
hard because there was evidence that, prior to repudiation, TEMI
had produced internal calculations showing termination payments
in excess of $600 million.169 The court concluded that TEMI’s
refusal was unreasonable and that TEMI had repudiated the
agreement; it then confronted the damage assessment issue.170
165. See Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc., No. 03 Civ.
6731(HB), 03 Civ. 6770(HB), 2005 WL 1863853, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2005)
If at any time a party had ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that the other
party’s termination payment ‘would exceed the value of the guaranty,’
it could provide written notice and request an increase in the guaranty
in the amount of the projected termination payment. PPSA §§ 7.1.2,
7.2.2. The other party would then have five business days to increase
its guaranty or it would be in default. In April 2003, AEP requested an
increase in TEMI’s guaranty based on its calculation of TEMI’s
projected termination payment, but TEMI refused to provide any
additional guaranty based on its belief that AEP had made an
unfounded demand that violated the ‘reasonable grounds’ requirement
of the PPSA.
166. See id. at *1 (“[P]rojections for electricity prices . . . fell significantly in
2001 and 2002. . . . TEMI realized it would lose a lot of money if it were to fully
perform under the PPSA and tried a number of ways to extricate itself . . . .”).
167. Id. at *2.
168. See id. at *4
Section 7.3 of the PPSA required the parties to exchange $50 million
guaranties to cover their potential credit exposures. AEP could also
request an increase in TEMI’s guaranty at any time AEP had
“reasonable grounds” to believe that the present value of “Gains” and
“Losses,” determined by PPSA § 7.1.2, exceeded $50 million.
169. See id. at *5 (“TEMI was fully aware that its liability . . . was greater
than the $50 million guaranty. . . . TEMI calculated its own Termination
Payment due AEP to be $667 million . . . .”).
170. There were a lot of other issues that I am ignoring. For example, TEMI
claimed that there was not a legally enforceable agreement; and AEP claimed
that it should be compensated for an alleged right to supply replacement
electricity during the period in which it was not yet producing electricity. TEMI
had no success with the first argument; AEP prevailed on the second one at trial,
but was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Supra notes 162–167 and
accompanying text.
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Each side provided expert testimony on AEP’s lost profits.
AEP’s witness concluded that the present value of its losses over
the twenty-year period was between $417 and $604 million with
the most likely case being $520 million.171 TEMI’s expert claimed
that AEP suffered no loss.172 In effect, he concluded that the
repudiation was a gift to AEP, so TEMI should pay nothing.173 The
trial judge was not impressed by either expert: “I found both
experts provided unreliable testimony and worse yet, it appeared
to be clouded by their obvious advocacy, to paraphrase a popular
show tune, on behalf of the lady they came in with.”174 But even if
they had done impeccable work, he would not have accepted it; it
would be too speculative:
In order to know what AEP’s revenues would be over the next
twenty years, one would have to be able to presage a vast and
varied body of facts. Any projection of lost profits would
necessarily include assumptions regarding the price of
electricity and the costs of operating over twenty years. One
would also need to surmise what competing forms of energy
such as coal and nuclear energy would cost over the same time
period. Also factoring into this calculation are the political and
regulatory developments over twenty years, population growth
in the Entergy region, and technological advances affecting the
production of power and related products. With so many
unknown variables, these experts might have done as well had
they consulted tealeaves or a crystal ball.175

So, he concluded, the lost profits damages were zero.176
171. Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc., 2005 WL 1863853, at *5.
172. See id. at *15 (“[A]ccording to Rausser’s figures, TEMI is actually harmed
by the termination of the PPSA (i.e., TEMI could have sold the power for far more
than it would have paid for it).”).
173. See id. (“Rausser’s analysis . . . defies common sense because it implies
not only that the Plaquemine plant revenues (without the PPSA) will far exceed
[AEP’s] estimate, but that they are in fact much greater than the payments TEMI
would have made to AEP under the PPSA.”).
174. Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc., No. 03 Civ.
6731(HB), 03 Civ. 6770(HB), 2006 WL 147586, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2006).
175. Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc., No. 03 Civ.
6731(HB), 03 Civ. 6770(HB), 2005 WL 1863853, at *11–12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8,
2005).
176. Id. The judge also claimed that since the plant had not yet operated, this
was a “new business,” and because New York is one of the few jurisdictions with
a per se rule against finding lost profits for a new business, there could be no lost
profits. For an analysis of the new business rule, see generally Victor P. Goldberg,
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The trial judge treated the lost profit claim as one of
consequential damages which, under New York law, require a
higher standard of proof than general damages. In his
reconsideration order he held that “even under the far more
flexible standard for general damages, AEP failed to meet its
burden of proof.”177 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed
on both counts.178 The damages were general, it held, and if proof
were disallowed because of all the confounding factors, no victims
of a repudiation of a long-term contract could ever be
compensated.179
The Court of Appeals found that AEP’s “lost profits” was the
appropriate damage remedy. It is important to recognize that “lost
profits” should not be viewed as a separate element of damages. It
is the change in the value of the asset—the contract. That would
be the expected future revenues had the contract been performed
less the amount AEP would receive in the plant’s next best use
(i.e., mitigation by selling at the new, lower expected market
price).180 Of course, since the electricity prices had collapsed, one
thing was clear—the value of the contract had to have increased.181
The New Business Rule and Compensation for Lost Profits, 1 CRITERION J. ON
INNOVATION 341 (2016) [hereainfter Goldberg, New Business Rule],
https://www.criterioninnovation.com/articles/goldberg-new-business-rule-lostprofits.pdf.
177. Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc., 487 F.3d 89, 109
(2d Cir. 2007).
178. See id. at 112 (“We . . . vacate the district court’s judgement denying AEP
damages pursuant to the Termination Payment provision. We remand for
reconsideration of AEP’s damages under the appropriate standard, and for any
further fact-finding the district court deems appropriate or necessary.”).
179. See id. Not a single product or service exists for which a company’s profit
margin, over time, is unaffected by fluctuating supply and demand, changes in
operating costs, increased competition from alternatives, alterations to the
relevant regulatory regime, population increases or decreases in the targeted
market, or technological advances. The variables identified by the district court
exist in every long-term contract. It is not the case that all such contracts may be
breached with impunity because of the difficulty of accurately calculating
damages.
180. See id. at 110 (“AEP seeks only what it bargained for—the amount it
would have profited on the payments TEMI promised to make for the remaining
years of the contract. This is most certainly a claim for general damages.”).
181. See id. at 93 (“The collapse of the energy market in 2001–02 significantly
diminished the value of the PPSA to TEMI, and TEMI began examining
strategies to free itself of its PPSA obligations.”).
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The TEMI expert’s conclusion that there were no damages could
not possibly have been correct.
The contract did include a mechanism for assessing a
market-related price to determine a termination payment:
The market price was to be “based on broker, dealer or exchange
quotations” for the immediately ensuing “five year period . . . or
such longer period for which a market is available.” PPSA
§ 7.1.2. Section 7.1.2 also specified that, to calculate the
projected Termination Payment, the market price of the
Products sold to TEMI “shall be based on broker, dealer or
exchange quotations” for five years, escalated at 3% per year
through the remaining term of the PPSA.182

Because the market was illiquid, there were no observable market
prices; to make up for that, AEP used “two-ways” to generate
forward prices for the five years.183 In a two-way, AEP would quote
both an offer to buy and to sell; “AEP’s bids and offers were fully
executable, [so] if another party decided to act on AEP’s numbers,
AEP would actually follow through and consummate the
transaction.”184 None did, but the court concluded that this was a
plausible form of market price discovery, one that TEMI itself had
used in the past.185
The court of appeals concluded that while the projection of lost
profits would be difficult, it is, in effect, the same exercise the
parties engaged in when negotiating the twenty-year contract in
the first place:
It is no less speculative for the district court to determine AEP’s
loss over the twenty-year period than it was for TEMI to
calculate its expected profit from the PPSA at the time it
entered into the agreement. The district court stated that the
parties’ respective experts could “have done as well had they
consulted tealeaves or a crystal ball.” If it is true that projecting
profits over twenty years is so absurdly speculative that
economists can do no better than fortune tellers, it would have
182. Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc., No. 03 Civ.
6731(HB), 03 Civ. 6770(HB), 2005 WL 1863853, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2005).
183. See id. at *5 (“AEP made a series of bids and offers (known as ‘two-ways’)
in order to ascertain the relevant market prices.”).
184. Id.
185. See id. (“[T]he facts demonstrate that this use of ‘two-ways’ as a means
of price discovery was a common practice at AEP, used in a variety of contexts,
and that TEMI itself had used ‘two-ways’ as a means of market price discovery.”).
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been imprudent for the parties to enter a contract for such a
long period in the first place. The reality, however, is that
long-term contracts are entered into regularly, and a degree of
speculation is acceptable in the business community.186

C. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co.
Carborundum promised to pay Lake River for bagging a
minimum quantity of its product (Ferro Carbo) over a three-year
period.187 Lake River stood ready to provide bagging services for up
to 400 tons per week for three years.188 Carborundum agreed to
pay for a minimum of 22,500 tons (a bit over one-third of the
maximum)189 for around $533,000.190 Because of a decline in the
market for Ferro Carbo, Carborundum ended up only requiring
Lake River to bag about half the minimum. Lake River sued for
payment for the other half. Carborundum defended by arguing
that this would be an unenforceable penalty, and the court, Judge
Posner, upheld the defense.191 I have argued elsewhere that this
was wrong.192 The minimum quantity clause was neither a penalty
nor a liquidated damages clause. The contract should have been
interpreted as Lake River granting Carborundum flexibility and
186. See Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc., 487 F.3d 89,
112 n.26 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting arguments that dismiss market price
speculation).
187. See Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1286 (7th Cir.
1985)
In consideration of the special equipment [i.e., the new bagging system]
to be acquired and furnished by LAKE–RIVER for handling the
product, CARBORUNDUM shall, during the initial three-year term of
this Agreement, ship to LAKE–RIVER for bagging a minimum
quantity of [22,500 tons]. If, at the end of the three-year term, this
minimum quantity shall not have been shipped, LAKE–RIVER shall
invoice CARBORUNDUM at the then prevailing rates for the
difference between the quantity bagged and the minimum guaranteed.
188. See id. (“Lake River would receive Ferro Carbo in bulk from
Carborundum, ‘bag’ it, and ship the bagged product to Carborundum’s
customers.”).
189. 400 tons per week for three years would be a bit more than 60,000 tons.
190. Lake River, 769 F.2d at 1286.
191. See id. at 1290 (“[W]e conclude that the damage formula in this case is a
penalty and not a liquidation of damages, because it is designed always to assure
Lake River more than its actual damages.”).
192. GOLDBERG, RETHINKING, supra note 7, at 83.
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that the minimum quantity was an element in the price Lake River
received for granting that flexibility.
In its brief, Carborundum presented a hypothetical. What if
during the entire three years Carborundum had delivered not even
one pound?193 It would be absurd, it argued, to bill Carborundum
for the entire 22,500 tons. But, given that Lake River would have
had to maintain its ability to bag 400 tons per week for the entire
period, it would not be at all absurd. That was the price
Carborundum paid for flexibility. Lake River would have fully
performed by holding itself ready for the entire three years. The
only breach, as in Prenalta, would have been Carborundum’s
failure to pay.
In the course of his opinion, Judge Posner posed a similar
hypothetical, but there was a big difference. “Suppose to begin
with that the breach occurs the day after Lake River buys its new
bagging system for $89,000 and before Carborundum ships any
Ferro Carbo.”194 He, like Carborundum, suggested that
compensating Lake River would have resulted in a huge windfall
and, therefore, it would be a penalty. There is, however, a
fundamental difference between the actual case in which the
three-year term had expired and Posner’s hypothetical one in
which one party repudiated prior to expiration. Would
Carborundum still have to pay for the 22,500 tons or would Lake
River have been required to mitigate its damages? Judge Posner
claimed that Lake River raised this argument: “Lake River argues
that it would never get as much as the formula suggests, because
it would be required to mitigate its damages.”195 He rejected the
argument because, he claimed, it would undercut the virtues of
liquidated damages.196
Properly understood, Lake River’s compensation, in this
hypothetical, would not be $533,000. The question that should
have been asked regarding the repudiation was, again, what was
the change in value of the asset—the contract? In effect, mitigation
would be baked into the damage measurement. That is, upon
193. Lake River, 769 F.2d at 1290.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1291. I assume that this was raised in oral argument because it
was not in the briefs.
196. Id. at 1292.
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repudiation Lake River no longer would have to remain ready to
bag any goods. In that sense it could mitigate by using its resources
for other purposes. To take an example even more extreme than
Judge Posner’s, suppose that the day after signing the agreement
and before any investments had been made, Carborundum
repudiated. And suppose further that there had been no change in
the market. This is really no different from the simple breach of a
widget contract in which the price had not changed. The price of
the contract would remain unchanged and damages would be zero.
D. Take-or-Pay in England
In M&J Polymers Ltd. v. Imerys Minerals Ltd.,197 an English
court was confronted for the first time with the question of whether
a take-or-pay clause was unenforceable because it was a
penalty.198 The contract, for the supply of chemical dispersants,
was for three years with monthly minimum quantities.199 The
buyer repudiated the contract but it had not paid for the minimum
quantities prior to the repudiation. The court framed the issue:
This issue relates to the claimant’s claim in respect of the
shortfall of deliveries . . . until the (repudiatory) termination of
the supply contract in May 2006. The claimant claims the price
of such shortfall, pursuant to the take or pay clause, article 5.5.
The defendant asserts that the claim pursuant to the take or
pay clause amounts to a penalty, and that the claimant must be
limited to a claim for breach of the defendant’s obligation under
article 5.3 to order the specified minimum quantities. It is
common ground that, once the contract was terminated, [i.e.,]
after May 2006 and in respect of the balance of the supply
contract, the claimant’s claim is in damages only, as it did not
seek to keep the contract alive.200

197. M&J Polymers Ltd. v. Imerys Minerals Ltd. [2008] EWHC (Comm) 344,
[2008] Bus LR D68 (Eng.).
198. See id. ¶ 40 (“It is strange that, at least according to the researches of
both Counsel, there is no previous authority as to whether a take or pay clause
amounts or can amount to a penalty.”).
199. See id. ¶ 4 (“The buyers collectively will pay for the minimum quantities
of products . . . even if they together have not ordered the indicated quantities
during the relevant monthly period.”).
200. Id. ¶¶ 68–69.
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That is, the court (and the parties) took for granted that the
repudiation did not entitle the seller to the contract price on the
remaining quantities. On the issue that it did face, it had no
difficulty rejecting the notion that the take-or-pay constituted a
penalty.201 In both respects the decision is consistent with my
interpretation of both the actual and hypothetical versions of Lake
River. That is, it would award full payment of the price for past
shortfalls and the contract/market differential for the post-breach
sales.
E. Summing Up
The “take-or-pay” and “minimum quantity” contracts are
basically the same. The former sets a series of minimum
obligations and the latter sets a single obligation. In a take-or-pay
contract, each period can be treated as an installment; so long as
the court does not find the contract terminated (an anticipatory
repudiation), the contract remains in force. If after the year (or
some other relevant time period) has passed and the buyer had
failed to take the required amount, the buyer would have to pay
the price multiplied by the shortfall, as the court found in
Prenalta.202 Likewise, if the parties agreed on a minimum quantity
over a fixed period, if the buyer failed to reach the minimum, then
the buyer should be liable for the same thing—the price multiplied
by the shortfall. That was the result rejected by Judge Posner in
Lake River. The take-or-pay contract has multiple periods while
the minimum quantity contract has but one. Analytically, there is
no difference.
If a buyer were to repudiate a take-or-pay contract, the
damages would not be the price multiplied by the shortfall. The
damages should be the change in value of the contract at the
moment of repudiation—the present value of the difference in the
expected cash flows. That would be based on the projected
201. See id. ¶ 48 (“I am entirely satisfied that the take or pay provision does
not offend against the rule against penalties and that the Claimant is entitled to
recover the price of the shortfall pursuant to Article 5.5.”).
202. Prenalta Corp. v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677, 680 (10th Cir.
1991). The shortfall could be modified by a make-up clause, but that does not alter
the principle.
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market/contract price differential or the lost profits, depending on
whether the seller could do something else with the goods in the
remaining years. We could call it mitigation, but it is more
straightforward to simply recognize it as an element in finding the
change in the value of the contract. In effect, that is what the court
did in Tractebel, and, as we shall see in the next Part, it is what
international arbitration tribunals do when assessing damages.
That seems to be the direction the courts were taking in both
Manchester Pipeline and Arkla, although both decisions were a bit
confused. Repudiation of a minimum quantity contract, as in
Posner’s hypothetical, should be no different. The major distinction
is that it would be a lot easier to assess damages because there
would be less difficulty in determining both the quantity and the
contract/market differential.
F. Why Damages at Time of Breach?
When I presented an earlier version of this paper in Germany,
the participants proposed two alternatives to reckoning the
damages for the repudiation of a long-term contract at the time of
the breach. Why not award specific performance? Or, alternatively,
why not wait until the full performance was due, perhaps requiring
the non-breacher to sue multiple times? In NIPSCO, discussed
above, the buyer asked for specific performance, but Judge Posner
rejected it:
Indeed, specific performance would be improper as well as
unnecessary here, because it would force the continuation of
production that has become uneconomical. Cf. Farnsworth,
supra, at 817–18. No one wants coal from Carbon County’s
mine. With the collapse of oil prices, which has depressed the
price of substitute fuels as well, this coal costs far more to get
out of the ground than it is worth in the market. Continuing to
produce it, under compulsion of an order for specific
performance, would impose costs on society greater than the
benefits. NIPSCO’s breach, though it gave Carbon County a
right to damages, was an efficient breach in the sense that it
brought to a halt a production process that was no longer
cost-justified.203
203. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 279 (7th
Cir. 1986).
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It would indeed have been inefficient for Carbon County to
continue producing coal that NIPSCO couldn’t use. But, Judge
Posner noted, specific performance does not require actual
performance.204 It simply would give the buyer a bargaining chip
and the seller would have to pay to lift the injunction. If there were
no holdup issues, the parties’ negotiations would determine the
value of the contract better than an ex post battle of the experts. If,
however, holdup was a significant problem, as would have been the
case in NIPSCO, the specific performance remedy becomes less
attractive. In cases in which the holdup potential is low, the
specific performance remedy might be superior to the damage
remedy. The holdup potential would be lower in the situation in
which the claimant could only sue seriatim for past failures; we
should expect that, because the holdup threat is weaker, the
parties might be able to negotiate a settlement that would reflect
their expectations about the future. The settlement value would
depend upon more than the expected future damages; it would also
reflect the expected costs of repeated suits and the vulnerability of
each of the parties to the timing of the damage payments. It is at
least plausible that parties might prefer a regime in which
multiple suits would be required to one in which the damages are
measured once and for all. The fact that the suits would be
204. See id. at 279–80
With continued production uneconomical, it is unlikely that an order
of specific performance, if made, would ever actually be implemented.
If, as a finding that the breach was efficient implies, the cost of a
substitute supply (whether of coal, or of electricity) to NIPSCO is less
than the cost of producing coal from Carbon County’s mine, NIPSCO
and Carbon County can both be made better off by negotiating a
cancellation of the contract and with it a dissolution of the order of
specific performance. Suppose, by way of example, that Carbon
County’s coal costs $20 a ton to produce, that the contract price is $40,
and that NIPSCO can buy coal elsewhere for $10. Then Carbon County
would be making a profit of only $20 on each ton it sold to NIPSCO
($40–$20), while NIPSCO would be losing $30 on each ton it bought
from Carbon County ($40–$10). Hence by offering Carbon County more
than contract damages (i.e., more than Carbon County’s lost profits),
NIPSCO could induce Carbon County to discharge the contract and
release NIPSCO to buy cheaper coal. For example, at $25, both parties
would be better off than under specific performance, where Carbon
County gains only $20 but NIPSCO loses $30. Probably, therefore,
Carbon County is seeking specific performance in order to have
bargaining leverage with NIPSCO, and we can think of no reason why
the law should give it such leverage.
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required does not, of course, mean that there would in fact be
multiple suits; it would simply provide the basis for settlement of
the future claims. To be clear, I am not proposing that requiring
multiple suits (rejecting anticipatory repudiation in long-term
contracts) would be superior; I am only raising the possibility that
this might be workable.
V. International Investment Arbitration
Complex long-term contracts, like the natural gas, Tractebel,
and NIPSCO contracts of the previous Part, typically involve a
substantial up-front investment by one party.205 After that
investment has been made, the investor faces a problem. The
counterparty might engage in holdup, taking advantage of the
investor’s vulnerability to revise the terms of the deal.206 The
contract should be structured to take this risk into account,
although as we have seen, the structuring does not resolve all the
problems. If the investment project is with a foreign country the
risks are exacerbated.207 The investor faces the possibility that the
State might choose not to honor the contract, or to reduce the
contract’s value by changes in regulations or by imposing taxes.208
Not all such actions by the government would be compensable.
That issue nowadays is typically determined in international
arbitration, often under a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).209
So, suppose that Oilco had entered into a participation
agreement with the Duchy of Grand Fenwick in which it would
explore for oil and, if successful, spend billions to exploit the field.
Oilco and Fenwick would then share the revenue according to a
205. See HERFRIED WÖSS, ET AL., DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
UNDER COMPLEX LONG-TERM CONTRACTS ¶¶ 6.04–6.06, at 246–48 (2014)
(discussing long-term contracts and sunk investments).
206. See Victor Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J.
ECON. 426, 439 (1976) (discussing “holdup”).
207. See WÖSS ET AL., supra note 205, ¶¶ 6.07–6.23, at 248–54 (discussing
governmental opportunism).
208. See id. ¶¶ 6.07–6.08, at 248–49 (“Governmental opportunism . . . can be
achieved via the subtle works of administrative process.”).
209. See Andre T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639,
651–54 (1998) (providing an historical analysis of bilateral investment treaties).
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preset formula. The project turned out to be successful and after a
few years of operation the price of oil increased far beyond what
the parties had anticipated when they entered into the
arrangement. Moreover, the government of Fenwick had changed
to one less friendly to large multi-national corporations. Although
the agreement had language that said that tax rates could only be
changed if both parties agree,210 suppose that Fenwick unilaterally
raised the rates.211 Or, perhaps, it simply declared the agreement
at an end. In either event, Oilco could bring an action under the
BIT, either for breach of contract or violation of the treaty or both.
Many BITs include an “umbrella” clause which is designed to
permit an investor to proceed against the State for a breach of

210. The contract would likely have included a “stabilization clause” which
“requires the mutual consent of the parties for a modification of a contract and
‘freezes’ the law of the host State, thereby preventing the State from using its
legislative power to modify the contract in its own favour.” SERGEY RIPINSKY WITH
KEVIN WILLIAMS, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 70 (2008).
However, the authors note:
[T]he right to nationalize and expropriate property in the public
interest—as a manifestation of the State’s sovereignty—exists
regardless of whether the property is contractual or non-contractual in
nature. . . . This does not mean, of course, that the State will be
absolved from the obligation to pay compensation for the lawful
expropriation of the contract rights in question.
Id. at 70–71.
211. See, e.g., Occidental Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, Final Award, London
Court of International Arbitration Administered Case No. UN 3467 (arbitral
tribunal
Jul.
1,
2004),
http://opiniojuris.org/wp-content/uploads/OxyEcuadorFinalAward_001.pdf. A number of similar arbitrations were triggered by
the rapid rise in oil prices following 2005; see Manuel A. Abdala & Pablo T.
Spiller, Chorzow’s Standard Rejuvenated: Assessing Damages in Investment
Treaty Arbitrations, 25 J. INT’L ARBITRATION, no. 1, 2008, at 103, 111–12.
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contract;212 and sometimes the investors are successful.213 In effect,
Oilco would argue that the State’s breach of the contract amounted
to destroying, or significantly impairing, the value of the asset.
Whether the claim is for breach of contract, breach of a treaty
obligation, or expropriation, if the panel were to find in favor of
Oilco, Fenwick would be liable for damages.214 What principles
should guide the arbitration panel?215
212. In 2004, about 40% of the 2500 BITs had some form of umbrella clause.
See Katia Yannaca-Small, Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment
Agreements 5 (OECD Working Papers on International Investment, Working
Paper No. 2006/3, 2006) (discussing the use of umbrella clauses). The clauses go
by many names:
Some [BITs] create an international law obligation that a host state
shall, for example, “observe any obligation it may have entered to”;
“constantly guarantee the observance of the commitments it has
entered into”; “observe any obligation it has assumed”, and other
formulations, in respect to investments. These provisions are
commonly called “umbrella clauses”, although other formulations have
also been used: “mirror effect”, “elevator”, “parallel effect”, “sanctity of
contract”, “respect clause” and “pacta sunt servanda”. Clauses of this
kind have been added to provide additional protection to investors and
are directed at covering investment agreements that host countries
frequently conclude with foreign investors.
Id. at 2.
213. See id. at 25 (“Arbitral tribunals, in their majority, when faced with a
‘proper’ umbrella clause, i.e. one drafted in broad and inclusive terms, seem to be
adopting a fairly consistent interpretation which covers all state obligations,
including contractual ones.”). At least one panel, however, has asserted that
purely contractual rights are not capable of being the object on an expropriation.
See generally Accession Mezzanine Capital L.P. & Danubius Kereskedöház
Vagyonkezelö Zrt. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/3 (Apr. 17, 2015).
214. Some contract claims could also be characterized as expropriations.
215. “[T]he general objective of full compensation is the same regardless of
whether a loss has been suffered as a result of a breach of contract or a breach of
international law.” RIPINSKY WITH WILLIAMS, supra note 210, at 106. “It has been
rightly pointed out that compensation for lawful and unlawful expropriation
cannot be the same, ‘for every legal system must necessarily make a distinction
between damages arising from lawful and unlawful acts.’” Id. at 65 (citing M.
SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 438 (2004)). They
cite some arbitrations which make the distinction and others which do not. Id. at
66, 84–85. Marboe says:
The idea that compensation is due in case of lawful expropriations and
damages in case of unlawful expropriations, thus seems to gain ground
in recent investment arbitration practice. It is, however, not yet
generally accepted. One of the main reasons might be the fact
that . . . in the English language, the term compensation is used for
both and almost as a synonym. . . . Thus, the necessity to differentiate
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The loss of a claimant like Oilco would be the value of the
contract (or property) that was taken—the change in the present
value of the expected future cash flows. The decision by the
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the Factory at
Chorzów216 is widely cited in arbitration awards as determining
the appropriate standard for compensation.217 The panel stated:
The essential principle . . . which seems to be established by
international practice and in particular by the decisions of
arbitral tribunals—is that reparation must, as far as possible,
wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish
the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that
act had not been committed.218

Timothy Nelson noted that the Chorzów panel did not have a
chance to implement its vision since the parties settled.219 Chorzów
really was nothing more than flowery rhetoric which has somehow
been elevated to a principle—a principle which commentators and
arbitration panels have felt free to mold to their own purposes.
Much of the controversy over Chorzów’s application has been
over determining the date at which damages should be measured.
Should it be reckoned at the date of breach, the date of decision, or
some time in between? Wöss, et al. characterize the Chorzów
principle as “equivalent to compensation for specific
performance.”220 Because the panel could not provide for actual
performance, this would entail awarding the financial equivalent,
monetary specific performance.221 That is, assuming the claimant’s
contract or property had not been impaired by the State, what
would it have been worth had the claimant held it until the time of
is not obvious.
IRMGARD MARBOE, CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, § 3.108, at 78–79 (2009) (citation omitted).
216. 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13).
217. See generally Timothy G. Nelson, A Factory in Chorzów: The Silesian
Dispute that Continues to Influence International Law and Expropriation
Damages Almost a Century Later, 1 J. DAMAGES INT’L ARBITRATION, no. 1, 2014, at
77; HERFRIED WÖSS, ET AL., supra note 205.
218. Factory at Chorzów, Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept.
13).
219. Nelson, supra note 217, at 77.
220. WÖSS ET AL., supra note 205, ¶6.25, at 255.
221. For a discussion of monetary specific performance, see GOLDBERG,
RETHINKING, supra note 7, at 29–30.
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the decision? Unlike some other commentators, the authors are
aware that this does not mean that damages must be measured at
the time of the decision (although that is what they ultimately opt
for).222 Compensation should be determined by the “but for” test:
how much would the asset (property, contract) have been worth
had there not been a breach, compared to what it is worth after the
breach.
As was argued above, when the adverse event occurs, the
claimant should be indifferent between damages measured at the
time of the breach and damages measured at the time of award (or
any other randomly chosen point in time).223 If in the intervening
years between breach (expropriation) and decision, oil prices rose
more than had been anticipated, Oilco would prefer time-of-award;
and if they had fallen Oilco would prefer time of the breach. But,
at the moment of breach, it would not have known which would
happen. So, under the “veil of ignorance” the claimant should be
indifferent. There is a crucial proviso to which I shall return,
namely, that the time-of-breach remedy must be bolstered by the
appropriate prejudgment interest rate.
Measuring damages at the moment of breach can be viewed as
answering the hypothetical question: for how much could you sell
the contract right to a willing buyer? Some arbitration panels
confuse this by treating the decision of when or whether to sell
post-breach as a fact question. So, for example, in Unglaube v.
Costa Rica,224 the panel “held that, but for the government
interference, the property owner could have sold at the peak of the
real estate market in 2006, when buyers were ‘plentiful’ and
therefore based damages on the hypothesis such a sale would have
occurred, albeit six-months before the true peak of the market.”225
And in Kardassopoulos v. Georgia,226
[T]he Tribunal observed that, “[i]n certain circumstances full
reparation for an unlawful expropriation will require damages
222. As we shall see below, they argue for the time-of-decision rule only if that
yields a higher award.
223. An award at the time of decision would, of course, include any losses (or
gains) incurred in the period prior to the decision.
224. Unglaube v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1 & ARB/09/20, Award
(May 16, 2012).
225. Nelson, supra note 217, at 90.
226. ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15, Award, ¶514 (Mar. 3, 2010).
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to be awarded as of the date of the arbitral Award.” On this
analysis, “[i]t may be appropriate to compensate for value
gained between the date of the expropriation and the date of the
award in cases where it is demonstrated that the Claimants
would, but for the taking, have retained their investment.” But
in that case, the ‘date of award’ approach was not adopted
because the evidence did not indicate that the claimants would
have continued to operate their investment, post-1995.227

Because the parties should be indifferent, the Chorzów
Factory principle tells us nothing about the point at which
damages should be reckoned and the role of post-breach
information. Arbitration panels have varied in their response.
While some have used the time of the award,228 the more common
approach has been to use the time of the breach.229
Wöss, et al. argue that Chorzów Factory does not pose an
either/or question.230 Recognizing that damages measured at the
time of award could be negative, they add a new wrinkle—the
claimant should receive the greater of the measured damages at
the time of the award and the time of the breach:
The reference to “wipe out all consequences of the illegal act”
establishes the full compensation principle for damages in
international law. Full compensation under the Chorzów case
means awarding the higher of the value of the company at the
moment of breach or at the moment of the award. If the moment

227. Nelson, supra note 217, at 91 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
228. See generally ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16,
Award (Oct. 2, 2006); Amco Asia Corp v. Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1,
Resubmission Award (Jun. 5, 1990), 1 ICSID Rep. 569 (1990); Siemens A.G. v.
Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award (Jan. 17, 2007); ConocoPhillips
Petrozuata B.V. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on Jurisdiction
and the Merits (Sep. 3, 2013).
229. See RIPINSKY WITH WILLIAMS, supra note 210, at 243–44
International law, both treaty and customary, is well settle on the
manner of the appropriate valuation date in cases of lawful
expropriation . . . they are largely uniform and refer, in most instances,
to the date of expropriation, or to the date before the impending
expropriation became public knowledge before the expropriation
became public knowledge, whichever is earlier.
230. See WÖSS ET AL., supra note 205, ¶ 5.199, at 242–43 (2014) (discussing
application of the Chorzów standard).
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of valuation is the date of award, lost profits from the date of
the breach to the date of the award have to be added.231

Their rationale appears to be that the expropriation would deprive
Oilco the option of selling its business at the time of the
expropriation so the value at that date should set a floor. Their
interpretation does not follow either from the Chorzów Factory
language or from the economic sense of the transaction. The
market price at the time of the treaty breach already included the
right to sell the business. The authors suggest that their
interpretation would give the State better incentives when
contemplating an expropriation. In effect, they tack on a penalty
to discourage the State from excessive taking:
[U]nder the asymmetric Chorzów Factory’s standard, a state
will never benefit, economically, from expropriation, and may
actually end up acquiring an asset for more than it is worth at
the time of expropriation. The asymmetry in Chorzów Factory
provides substantial incentives for states to be cautious in
undertaking expropriatory actions.232

Even if one were to believe that penalizing the State is a good idea,
the notion that the penalty should take this particular form is a
non sequitur.
The decision might come years after the breach and years
before the contract was to end. Measured damages will depend on
how interest is taken into account.233 There are two questions
relating to interest: the discount rate for future gains and losses
and, if the damages are measured at the time of the breach, the
prejudgment interest rate (PJI). Claimants desire a low discount
rate and a high PJI, and respondents the reverse. Not surprisingly,
expert witnesses differ, although the extent of the disagreement
might be surprising (and disappointing). To illustrate the extent of
their disagreement, in one arbitration the claimant proposed a
discount rate and PJI of 10.63%; the respondent’s experts proposed
a discount rate of 19.85% and a PJI of 2.9%.234 The panel chose
231. Id. ¶ 5.180, at 237–38.
232. M. A. Abdala, P. T. Spiller & S. Zuccon, Chorzów’s Compensation
Standard as Applied in ADB v. Hungary, 4(3) TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MGMT., 5–
6 (2007).
233. The same is true of the sort of domestic long-term contracts discussed in
Part IV.
234. Guaracachi America Inc. & Ruralec PLC v. Bol., PCA Case No. 2011-17,
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neither, setting the discount rate at 14.33% and the PJI at
5.633331%.235
A useful way of framing the question is to pose it
(hypothetically) to the claimant at the moment of breach: at what
point would you want the damages be reckoned? As I noted above,
the parties should be indifferent, ex ante, between two measures:
damages at the time of the breach plus prejudgment interest (PJI)
and damages at the time of decision (including actual losses in the
post-breach, pre-decision period). The equivalence depends on
choosing the proper prejudgment interest rate. Experts generally
agree that the discount rate should be the weighted average cost
of capital (WACC).236 As the previous paragraph shows there is
room for substantial disagreement, but at least there is general
agreement on the principle. That is not the case with PJI.237 Some
economists argue that the WACC should also be used for the PJI.238
Others argue for a risk-free rate.239 I find the risk-free rate
argument more compelling, but I need not resolve the matter here.
As, Wöss, et al. indicate, arbitration panels have used a variety of
PJI’s, some ad hoc.240 For my purposes it is enough to recognize
that if we choose the “wrong” PJI the equivalence no longer holds.
The possible non-equivalence might incline one to opt for the
time-of-decision measure of damages, incorporating all the
Award, ¶ 295 (Jan. 31, 2014).
235. Id. ¶ 603. For a discussion of damage estimation in that case, see
Jonathan A. Lesser, A Case Study in Damage Estimation: Bolivia’s
Nationalization of EGSA, 1 J. DAMAGES INT’L ARBITRATION, no. 2, 2014, at 103.
236. See WÖSS ET AL., supra note 205, ¶ 6.152, at 296 (“For the purposes of
discounting future cash flows as the of the date of valuation, it is widely accepted
that the appropriate risk-adjusted discount factor the weighted average cost of
capital . . . .”).
237. Arbitrators might choose a statutory rate. If the contract included a New
York choice of law, for example, the arbitrators might choose New York’s
statutory rate—9% simple interest, a rate that bears no relation to reality.
238. See generally Manuel A. Abdala, Pablo D. Lopez Zadicoff & Pablo T.
Spiller, Invalid Round Trips in Setting Pre-Judgment Interest in International
Arbitration, 5 WORLD ARBITRATION & MEDIATION REV., no. 1, 2011, at 11; WÖSS ET
AL., supra note 205, ¶¶ 6.107–6.120, at 281–87.
239. See Franklin M. Fisher & R. Craig Romaine, Janis Joplin’s Yearbook and
the Theory of Damages, J. ACCOUNTING AUDITING & FIN., Winter/Spring 1990, at
145 (arguing for a risk-free rate).
240. See WÖSS ET AL., supra note 205, ¶ 6.108, at 282–83 (“There is, however,
little consensus among arbitrators on the appropriate PJI.”).
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post-breach information. However, there is a countervailing factor.
Some of the changes that occurred post-breach could have been
caused by the breach. Suppose, for example, that after Fenwick
took control of the oil field Oilco threatened to sue anyone who
purchased the oil; as a result sales declined and the price for the
oil that was sold was reduced.241 Or suppose that the expropriation
had resolved an assembly problem, increasing the value.242 The
decision-date measure of damages would have to be modified to
account for all value changes that were caused by the breach.
The expected value of the date-of-breach and the
date-of-award measures is roughly the same, subject to the
qualifications in the previous paragraphs. My preference for a
default rule is the date-of-breach which would make it consistent
with contract damage measures generally. The important point is
that whatever rule is chosen, that it be chosen behind the veil of
ignorance. Parties could choose to opt out of the default rule in
their initial agreement or, perhaps, in the BIT.243 If the period
between breach and filing were short, the claimant could be given
the choice between the date-of-filing and the date-of-decision. That
might be a feasible compromise. The key point is that at the time
of breach, there is no reason to believe that the choice of a
measurement date would systematically favor one party.
The Oilco hypothetical presupposed that the project was
already producing revenue. What if the State were to renege at an
earlier stage? That was the problem the panel faced in

241. See Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6,
Decision on Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and on Liability, ¶ 697 (Sept. 12,
2014) (“The State held auctions and Perenco, it appears, threatened suit against
any person who bought the oil that had been seized from it.”).
242. For example, by combining Oilco’s holding with an adjacent property, it
might be able to unitize the field and develop it more efficiently.
243. BITs are typically silent on remedies for breach of treaty obligations
other than expropriations. A 2012 OECD study found that many treaties specify
a compensation standard for expropriations, but that only 9% include some
language on remedies and only 3% expressly mention pecuniary remedies. See
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT PUBLIC CONSULTATION: 16 MAY–9 JULY 2012 ¶ 61 (2012),
http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/50291642
.pdf (“The OECD survey of ISDS provisions confirms that while many treaties
address remedies for expropriation, remedies for other violations are rarely
specifically identified.”).
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Metalclad.244 Metalclad had a federal permit to build a hazardous
waste landfill. The local government, Guadalcazar, effectively
prevented it from opening the landfill. Metalclad claimed that Mexico
had violated the NAFTA agreement and the arbitration panel agreed,
holding that the measures were “tantamount to expropriation.”245
Metalclad asked for damages based on the discounted cash flow of
future profits, or, alternatively, its actual investment.246 The panel
rejected the lost profits measure because there had been no track
record of earnings, adopting instead Metalclad’s actual investment.247
In effect, it applied a modified new business rule: if the business has
not operated, presume that it would not make more than the
opportunity cost of capital (hence zero expected future earnings); but
if the firm had already made specific investments it could recover
some, or all, of its investment (reliance costs).248
I have presumed that the breach took place at a single point
in time. However, there might be a series of actions that adversely
affect Oilco—a problem that has been labeled “creeping
expropriation.”249 Suppose, for example, that Fenwick imposed a
tax on Oilco in year 1 and a second tax in year 2, and more taxes
in subsequent years, and suppose further that an arbitration panel
concluded that these taxes violated the BIT. I don’t think this
244. Metalclad Corp. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1.
245. Metalclad Corp. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 104
(Jan. 2, 1997); see also id. ¶ 103
[E]xpropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and
acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal
or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host State, but also covert
or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect
of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or
reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not
necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State.
246. See Metalclad Corp. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Notice of
Claim, ¶ 4 (Jan. 2, 1997) (“Complainant seeks damages in the approximate
amount of $43,125,000 (U.S.) plus damages for the value of Complainant’s
enterprise which are not yet fully determined.”).
247. See Metalclad Corp. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award,
¶¶ 114–122 (Jan. 2, 1997) (outlining the panel’s methodology).
248. For more on the “new business rule” and why there should be no recovery
of lost profits in a case like Metalclad, see generally Goldberg, New Business Rule,
supra note 176.
249. W.M. Reisman & R.D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation
in the BIT Generation, 74 YALE L. SCH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 115, 122
(2003).
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should make damage assessment any more difficult. Each tax may
be viewed as a partial breach with damages assessed for the period
in which it was in force.250 If the taxes eventually resulted in the
total destruction of value, then the final component of the award
should be for what was left after the penultimate tax hike. It
should be the present value of the stream of future losses valued
at the time of the final breach and it should be added to the actual
losses incurred in the previous partial breaches.
VI. Concluding Remarks
What does it mean to make the victim of a contract breach
whole? I have argued that the contract should be viewed as an
asset and the claimant’s loss would be the change in value of that
asset.251 Damages could be measured at the time of the breach,
using only information available at that time. Or damages could
be reckoned at some future date, in particular the decision date,
utilizing post-breach data. Given that the value of the asset (the
contract) can fluctuate, it should not matter which we choose, so
long as that choice was made before the dispute arises. I think the
breach date is more straightforward, but the more important point
is that the issue should be off the table once a dispute arises.
Essentially, the choice of the date of valuation should be under a
“veil of ignorance.”
The contract as asset approach proved useful even in the case
of a breach of a simple commodity contract. But the big payoff was
for the anticipatory repudiations of long-term contracts with
termination dates after the decision date. For a commodity
contract breached on the date of performance, the remedy would
simply be the market/contract differential on that date. The only
issue in this type of case is how to treat “cover.” My claim was that
cover should not be viewed as an alternative remedy (and certainly
not as a preferred alternative remedy), but as evidence of the
market price. An alleged cover transaction that occurs
immediately after the breach calling for the same quantity of an
250. This would be roughly the same as treating each partial breach as a
breach of an installment, as in Prenalta and M&J Polymers.
251. If consequential damages were recoverable, then that could be an
additional loss.
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identical commodity at the same location would obviously be
acceptable. The further it deviated from this ideal, the weaker the
presumption that it reflects the aggrieved party’s loss.
Long-term contracts present two different issues: a shortfall
in an individual installment and an anticipatory repudiation of the
entire agreement. For the former, whether the contract is a
take-or-pay agreement or a minimum quantity agreement for
which the seller brought suit after the term expired, the remedy
would simply be the price multiplied by the shortfall. The only
breach would be a failure to pay—the value of the contract itself
would not be impaired. For the latter, the problem is to ascertain
the change in the value of the asset—the contract. The present
discounted value of the change in value will reflect expectations
regarding the market price, the contract price, quantity, cost of
production, and, perhaps, future events that might result in early
termination of the contract. Both lost profits and mitigation are
captured by the valuation of the contract. By focusing on the
change in the value of the contract-asset, the approach delineates
which “lost profits” matter. So, for example, if, as in the Lake River
hypothetical, a buyer repudiated a contract before there had been
any reliance and before the market had changed, a court might
erroneously find lost profits as the projected quantity times the
seller’s markup. I would argue that the proper damage measure in
such a case would be zero, or nominal at best.
The basic methodology for valuation is now standard, but as
the divergent valuation estimates in Tractebel illustrate, there is
a lot of room for experts to disagree.252 To get some indication of
the potential for disagreement, we can return to Widgetco.
However, instead of considering a failure to deliver shares of stock,
suppose that Widgetco had been acquired, but that some minority
shareholders have asked for an appraisal. The shareholders and
the corporation then present expert testimony on the value of the
shares. The techniques used for this exercise are essentially the
same as would be employed to ascertain the contract damages.
About two decades ago, Wertheimer collected data on expert
valuations in Delaware appraisal cases and his data show
252. Recall also the disagreements over the discount rate and prejudgment
interest rate in Guaracachi America Inc. v. Bol., PCA Case No. 2011-17, Award
(Jan. 31, 2014) where the parties proposed different discount rates and the
arbitration panel chose a completely new rate.
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substantial divergences, some by a factor of ten or more.253 In a
more recent study, Choi and Talley found that the gap had
declined, but was still substantial.254 As then Vice Chancellor Allen
asserted, “if the court will ultimately reject both parties DCF
[discounted cash flow] analysis and do its own, the incentive of the
contending parties is to arrive at estimates of value that are at the
outer margins of plausibility—that essentially define a bargaining
range.”255 If the damage estimates of experts in long-term contract
and expropriation cases are destined to be at the outer margins of
plausibility (and perhaps beyond),256 are there some techniques
available to courts or arbitration panels to narrow their
disagreement?
I will note three. First, neutral experts could be appointed;
their role could be defined in various ways. They could critique the
reports of the party-appointed experts or, perhaps, perform their
own damage studies. Second, some courts, notably in Australia,
and some arbitration panels have used “hot-tubbing.”257 There are
a number of variations on this practice. For example, the experts
could question each other or arbitrators could question the
witnesses directly.258 The presumption is that the process would
253. See Barry Wertheimer, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy and How
Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 630–31 (1998) (noting that
“[b]ecause of the inherent subjectivity and estimate involved, the parties’ experts
can compute dramatically different valuations, even if they utilize the same
methodology”).
254. See Albert Choi & Eric Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal
Rule 2 (Va. Law and Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2017-01, 2017) (finding
that expert “valuation opinions can diverge by a factor of two or more”).
255. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at
*26 (Oct. 19, 1990).
256. In Guaracachi America, Bolivia’s expert argued implausibly that there
would be no damages. See generally Jonathan A. Lesser, A Case Study in Damage
Estimation: Bolivia’s Nationalization of EGSA, 1 J. OF DAMAGES IN INT’L
ARBITRATION 103, 116 (2014). The defendant’s claim of no harm in Tractebel was
equally implausible.
257. See, e.g., Jeff Gray, Why Judges like ‘Hot-tubbing’, GLOBE & MAIL (Apr.
19,
2011),
https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industrynews/the-law-page/why-judges-like-hot-tubbing/article577733/?ref=http://www.
theglobeandmail.com& (last visited Feb. 3, 2018) (“‘Hot-tubbing,’ common
practice in Australian courts, is also known by the less colourful label ‘concurrent
evidence.’ It means that expert witnesses in a complex, technical trial . . . can
testify in court together on a panel, rather than one-by-one in the witness box.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
258. See Frances P. Kao et al., Into the Hot Tub . . . A Practical Guide to
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constrain the experts and narrow the range of their
disagreement.259
Third, the court or panel could adopt a form of “final-offer
arbitration.”260 The court’s choice would be limited; it could not mix
and match pieces of the different reports, split the baby, or impose
any estimate proffered by neither party. It could choose only one
party’s measure. When Vice Chancellor Allen attempted to
implement it in an appraisal proceeding, he told both parties “that
it was [his] inclination and [his] temperamental approach . . . to
want to accept one expert or the other hook, line and sinker.”261
The logic is simple enough. If a party were to get too aggressive,
the decision maker would choose the other side’s estimate.
Recognizing that, both parties have an incentive to take a less
aggressive position. Their estimates should converge, thereby
narrowing the range of disagreement, or, in Allen’s words, return
us from the “outer margins of plausibility.”262

Alternative Expert Witness Procedures in International Arbitration, 44 INT’L LAW
1035, 1040 (2010) (“[T]he Arbitral Tribunal, upon request of a Party or on its own,
may vary this order of proceeding, including the arrangement of testimony by
particular issues or in such a manner that witnesses presented by different
Parties be questioned at the same time and in confrontation with each other.”).
259. See id. at 1043 (“[H]aving experts give testimony concurrently with
professional peers is likely to reduce embellishment, avoidance of tough issues,
and harsh rhetoric, which, in turn, can reduce overall hostility in a contentious
matter.”).
260. This is sometimes referred to as “baseball arbitration” because of its use
in salary arbitrations between Major League baseball teams and players. Josh
Chetwynd, Play Ball? An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration, Its Use in Major
League Baseball and Its Potential Applicability to European Football Wage and
Transfer Disputes, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 109, 109 (2009).
261. Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 358 (Del.
1997). For more on the use of final offer arbitration in appraisal cases, see
generally Christian J. Henrich, Game Theory And Gonsalves: A Recommendation
For Reforming Stockholder Appraisal Actions, 56 BUS. LAW. 697 (2001).
262. Technicolor, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *26. In Gonsalves it did not
work very well, perhaps because the parties believed that the Delaware Supreme
Court would reject the method. The corporation’s valuation was $131.60 while the
shareholder proposed $1059.37. Gonsalves, 701 A.2d at 358–59. Indeed, the
Delaware Supreme Court did reject the method, finding that “the Court of
Chancery’s pretrial decision to adhere to, and rely upon, the methodology and
valuation factors of one expert to the exclusion of other relevant evidence and the
implementation of that mind-set in the appraisal process was error as a matter
of law.” Id.
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There is no question that estimating the damages in
long-term, complex agreements will be difficult and that courts,
arbitration panels, and (gasp) lay juries will be confronted with
reports and testimony that will make their eyes glaze over and
their heads hurt. Still, it has to be done, unless we just want to
label all such damages as “speculative,” and deny all recovery.
Perhaps in the future, parties (or arbitration treaties) will include
some guidelines (methods for determining prejudgment interest
rates, discount rates, projected prices, etc.) to constrain the experts
in their damage estimates. My concern in this paper has not been
with the nuts and bolts of damage estimation, but instead with the
conceptual framework.

